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INTRODUCTION
Several recent cases have suggested that Due Process and Equal Protection
are interconnected such that in any particular case the one may inform the other.1
+
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York Times, Twentieth Century in Review (Fitzroy-Dearborn, 2001). The author would like to
thank Professor Mark Strasser of Capital University Law School, Professor Nadia Sawicki of
Loyola University Chicago Law School, and Dr. Howard Kaplan, of Washington State University
Counseling and Psychological Services, for their very helpful clarifying comments to an earlier
draft of this Article. This Article is dedicated to Justice Anthony Kennedy in appreciation for
both his recognition of and very important votes for the constitutional rights of LGBT people.
1. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724 (2018) (holding that the Civil Rights Commission’s expression of hostility toward the baker’s
religion violated the Free Exercise Clause); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015)
(holding that under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
same sex couples may exercise their fundamental right to marry); United States v. Windsor, 570
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The cases that suggest an interconnection do so in order to expand the range of
protected interests, some of which have been recognized as fundamental,
without exactly saying what the connection is. This raises some serious
questions for future cases, since it is unclear how a future court will look at this
material to decide cases under the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses, let
alone cases involving their interconnection. For instance, might a court decide
that both interests must be present in which case the range of protected rights
might actually be contracted? This Article hopes to answer this question by
offering a principled framework derived from a broader analysis of liberty and
equality, grounded in the idea of “personhood,” understood collectively, for how
Due Process and Equal Protection might be worked together to aid future courts
in deciding cases. Since concerns in these areas are likely to raise issues of
policy and principle, this Article will also call attention to the roles of legislative
versus judicial bodies in the protection of important interests. In the end, the
reader should comprehend that a true understanding of human liberty requires
not just an understanding of the various liberty interests involved (some of which
will be fundamental, some not), but also how those liberty interests are
interpreted to not disadvantage classes of people.
Section I will describe the Court’s traditional approach to identifying
fundamental rights under Due Process and Equal Protection, and present an
example from case law where a claimed justification under Equal Protection
may have been better founded under Due Process. Section II reviews the case
Plyler v. Doe,2 and how the Supreme Court attempted to relate Due Process and
Equal Protection concerns together to broaden the range of protected interests
under the Due Process clause. Section III more fully describes the problems that
may arise from the majority opinion’s language in Obergefell v. Hodges3
regarding the connection between Due Process and Equal Protection. Section
IV shows the relation of Due Process and Equal Protection in context of a
broader philosophical discussion about the relationship of liberty and equality.
Section V then attempts to resolve some of the concerns raised in Section III by
setting forth a philosophical foundation for a collective conception of the person
that affirms background human rights. This is followed by Section VI, which
applies this philosophical conception to re-conceptualize the current way Due
Process and Equal Protection should be seen by the courts as interconnected.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

In an important article from the late 1980s entitled Sexual Orientation and the
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act as an unconstitutional deprivation
of the liberty of persons protected by the Fifth Amendment).
2. 457 U.S. 202, 211–13 (1982).
3. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
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Protection,4 Professor Cass Sunstein describes a then-emerging view of Due
Process and Equal Protection, which would operate both in Washington v.
Glucksberg,5 the assisted suicide case, and the various Second Amendment
cases,6 but would later be expressly repudiated in Obergefell,7 the same-sex
marriage case. That now “traditional” view as described by Sunstein,
notwithstanding the Court’s reluctance to recognize minority rights, is as
follows:
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted
largely (though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices against
short-run departures. The clause has therefore been associated with a
particular conception of judicial review, one that sees the courts as
safeguards against novel developments brought about by temporary
majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history.
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, has been understood as an
attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory
practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding. The Due
Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the Due
Process issue whether an existing or time-honored convention,
described at the appropriate level of generality, is violated by the
practice under attack. By contrast, the Equal Protection Clause looks
forward, serving to invalidate practices that were widespread at the
time of its ratification and were expected to endure. The two clauses
therefore operate along different tracks.8
With this insightful comment in mind, it is helpful to briefly describe in this
Section a few Due Process and Equal Protection cases that arguably overlap and
how these cases came to identify and protect fundamental rights.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky noted “[t]he Supreme Court has held that some
liberties are so important that they are deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’ and
4. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163–64 (1988).
5. 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
6. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the Second
Amendment right to bear arms against the states via the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (interpreting the meaning
of the Second Amendment, the Court stated that “[f]rom our review of founding-era sources, we
conclude that this natural meaning was also the meaning that ‘bear arms’ had in the 18th century.
In numerous instances, ‘bear arms’ was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons
outside of an organized militia”). In McDonald v. City of Chicago, “[t]he Court clarified that the
governing standard is whether a particular Bill of Rights protection is fundamental to our Nation’s
particular scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 744 (citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). “[O]r, as the Court has said in a related context,
whether it is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. at 744 (quoting Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 721).
7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
8. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1163.
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that generally the government cannot infringe upon them unless strict scrutiny
is met,” requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling interest.9 Among
the various liberties Chemerinsky says the Court had in mind are a number of
rights that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but still held to be
fundamental under the Due Process clause.10 That clause appears in two distinct
areas of the Constitution: the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part: “No person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”11 Part of the Bill
of Rights, ratified in 1791, the amendment was originally meant to be a
restriction on federal authority in order to guarantee states’ rights and individual
liberties.12 This limitation was expanded in 1868 to also limit states’ authority
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which similarly states in
pertinent part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”13 Given the similarity of the two
clauses, rights found to be fundamental under either Amendment’s Due Process
clause will generally apply against both federal and state governments.14 The
clause (speaking collectively here) protects both “substantive due process”
rights, which are those usually considered when talking about un-enumerated
fundamental rights, as well as procedural Due Process rights.15 For purposes of
this Article, the focus will be on substantive Due Process rights, as those are
most likely to involve basic liberty interests.16
9. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 826 (5th ed.
2015).
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend V.
12. Was the Bill of Rights Meant to Apply to the States?, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR.,
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/10/13/was-the-bill-of-rights-meant-to-apply-to-the-states/
(last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
13. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
14. Due Process Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION,
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/14/essays/170/due-process-clause
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2018) (stating “[m]odern law interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
impose the same substantive due process and procedural due process requirements on the federal
and state governments”).
15. See id.
16. “Substantive due process is the notion that due process not only protects certain legal
procedures, but also protects certain rights unrelated to procedure.” Substantive Due Process,
CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/substantive_due_process
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018). Initially, the Court’s acknowledgement of Substantive Due Process
rights had a rather strained history in protecting the right to contract against a New York law that
regulated the working hours of bakers. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57, 64 (1905). That
view was mostly repudiated in W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937), in which
the Court upheld the constitutionality of minimum wage requirements for women. Since W. Coast
Hotel Co., the Court has acknowledged a substantive right to non-economic freedom of choice.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925) (holding that requiring public
schooling interfered with parents’ rights to determine the appropriate education of their children);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (invalidating a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching
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The Fourteenth Amendment also provides “nor [shall any state] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”17 This provision
is important for two reasons: first, because it makes clear the scope and breadth
of the Due Process freedoms that the Court has thus far identified, and second,
because it protects various identifiable classes of individuals that the Court has
recognized as uniquely susceptible to suffering invidious discrimination.
Among the various substantive Due Process rights the Court has deemed
fundamental are rights protecting the autonomy of the family—the right to
marry,18 rights with respect to procreation,19 sexual activity20 (including private
consensual homosexual activity),21 and medical care decision-making.22 Also
fundamental are rights elsewhere enumerated in the Constitution, including the

of foreign languages as interfering with the “calling” of language teachers and parents to decide the
education of their children). The Court has also acknowledged a fundamental substantive right to
privacy. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693–94, 699 (1977) (extending the
right to privacy to obtain contraceptives to minors); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164, 166
(1973) (holding a woman has a constitutional privacy right to choose whether to bear or beget a
child); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending the privacy right to use
contraceptives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding
that married persons had a constitutional privacy right to use contraceptives and physicians to
advise on their use). In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), the Supreme Court struck
down state sodomy laws that criminalized same-sex sexual behavior between consenting adults as
interfering with intimate consensual sexual conduct.
17. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
18. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding Virginia’s miscegenation statutes that
made interracial marriage involving a white person a crime violated the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
19. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (striking down a state law banning the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons, noting “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”). In
Roe v. Wade, the Court found a woman’s right to an abortion is encompassed within the
constitutional right to privacy that it had first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, allowing her
complete autonomy on the question in the first trimester and restricting the state’s interest in
different ways in the second (to protect maternal health) and third (to protect prenatal life except
where the life and health of the mother was at stake) trimesters. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53;
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. That decision’s central holding of a constitutional right to abortion was
reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, but the trimester system for limiting the state’s interest
was replaced with an “undue burden” test. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46,
876–77 (1992); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015) (holding the
fundamental Due Process right to marry, that had come to be recognized in several previous cases,
extends to same-sex couples).
20. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693–94, 699 (holding that a state law that burdened a fundamental
right by denying distribution of contraceptives to anyone under age 16 must be justified by a
compelling state interest).
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
22. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990).
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freedom of speech,23 the right to bear arms,24 and religious freedom.25 The latter
three, while specifically provided for by the First and Second Amendments, have
nevertheless been applied against the states by way of the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Reverse incorporation, allowing Equal Protection
to apply to the federal government, has also been held by the Court to be
accommodated by the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause, as that Amendment
has no express Equal Protection clause.27
On the Equal Protection side are cases involving the fundamental right to
travel28 and, while never actually being deemed “fundamental,” a long assumed
right to vote.29 The latter is recognized by virtue of the protections afforded it
by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, adopted in 1870,

23. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). While upholding a state criminal anarchy
statute, the Court noted:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among
the fundamental personal rights and “liberties” protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. U.S. CONST. amend II.
25. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961). The Court stated, while upholding a
Sunday retail sale ban, that “[t]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.” Id.
26. See Incorporation Doctrine, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/incorporation_doctrine (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). “The
incorporation doctrine is a constitutional doctrine through which the first ten amendments of the
United States Constitution (known as the Bill of Rights) are made applicable to the states through
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
27. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954). The Court recognized for the first time
“reverse incorporation,” so that Equal Protection, as understood under the Fourteenth Amendment,
could be applied under the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause to include the District of
Columbia, as it is under the authority of the federal government and not any state government. Id.
In that case, the Court wrote, “We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.”
Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954)) (emphasis added). It further stated:
The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal
protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states.
But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American
ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal protection of the laws” is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we
do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has
recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Id. at 498–99 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
28. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 630 (1969) (holding “that the statutory
prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an
invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws”).
29. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that the
state’s poll tax was an unconstitutional violation of Equal Protection).
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1920, and 1992 respectively.30 Additionally, with respect to Equal Protection,
the Court has recognized different classifications for distributing benefits or
burdens, warranting different degrees of scrutiny in order to protect against
systematic and invidious discrimination.31 For example, if the classification is
based on race or ethnicity the Court will treat the classification as suspect,32 and
will analyze the government’s attempted restriction under strict scrutiny, which
requires the government to show that the suspect classification is justified by a
compelling state interest that is narrowly drawn to meet such interest.33 If the
classification is based on gender or illegitimacy—descriptions associated with
impermissible stereotypes that unjustifiably burden receipt of benefits by
members of particular groups—the Court will analyze any proposed restrictions
based on heightened scrutiny and require the government to show that the
classification “serve[s] important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to those objectives.”34 In most other cases, it is usually
enough that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose in order to pass Constitutional muster, which allows the government a
great deal of freedom, provided that the government action is not deemed to be
outside what is constitutionally permitted.35 However, the Court has chosen in
a few select cases to apply a “heightened rational basis test” that requires a
greater showing of justification by the state than would otherwise be required
under traditional rational basis review.36 In both a case involving state denial of
a special use permit for a mental health facility,37 and a case in which the state
barred by constitutional amendment its own legislature and local municipalities

30. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The Nineteenth Amendment provides:
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The Twenty-Sixth
Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
31. See, e.g., Suspect Classification, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/suspect_classification.
32. Id.
33. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 333 (2003); see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny but still upholding the relocation of
Japanese-American citizens during World War II).
34. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461
(1988) (holding intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on illegitimacy).
35. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1949) (noting that
public safety constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose); Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78–79 (1911) (holding that “[o]ne who assails the classification . . . must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary”).
36. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–43 (1985).
37. Id. (invalidating a zoning ordinance that prevented operation of a residence for the
mentally disabled).
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from affording protections against sexual orientation discrimination,38 the Court,
while still claiming to follow a rational basis form of review, found both state
governments’ actions violated federal Equal Protection because the actions were
an illegitimate exercise of governmental power that was likely based on animus
toward a particular group.39 Indeed, in the latter case, it has been suggested that
the Court seemed to be applying a per se test to undermine the challenged
provision.40 This suggests the Court regards the function of the Equal Protection
clause to offset systemic biases that have previously gone unseen, preventing
these biases from continuing to affect governmental decision-making. The
Court has even done this while not always defining a unique level of scrutiny
for its decision.
A possible overlap of Due Process and Equal Protection is Zablocki v.
Redhail, a case where one of the justices agreed with the majority’s decision that
a law forbidding a non-custodial parent behind in child support obligations from
marrying violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but questioned whether Equal
Protection, as it was relied upon by the majority, was actually the correct analysis
for the decision, or if the case should have instead been analyzed under the Due
Process fundamental right to marry.41 Here the Court questioned the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that prevented residents with noncustodial children who were under a court order or judgment to make child
support payments from obtaining a marriage license unless such residents first
showed compliance with their child support obligation.42 In holding the
statutory classification violated Equal Protection, the Court, per Justice
Marshall, took particular note that the classification affected only persons with
child support obligations, ignoring that Wisconsin law already permitted the
court other avenues for enforcing support obligations, as might arise from a prior
marriage or children born out of wedlock, such as “wage assignments, civil
contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties.”43 Justice Marshall then offered
38. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
39. See id. at 634 (finding no legitimate purpose in signaling out this particular group (gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals) from using the normal political process).
40. See id. This possibility of a new per se doctrine is suggested by Justice Kenney’s majority
opinion, where he wrote:
[T]hat laws of this kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. “If the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). Justice Scalia in his dissent
acknowledges that this might be a new doctrine when he wrote, “[T]he Court today has [taken sides
in a culture war], not only by inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the
victory away from traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to
traditional attitudes.” Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 375.
43. Id. at 389–90.

2019]

At the Intersection of Due Process and Equal Protection

95

a seemingly Due Process kind of argument stating, “When a statutory
classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
[and the Court had reaffirmed marriage to be as part of the right to privacy], it
cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests
and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”44 Not finding such a
justification for a non-custodial parent who was merely behind in child support
payments, the Court struck down the statute, not as a violation of Due Process,
but instead as a violation of Equal Protection, in effect creating a new category
of Equal Protection for violations of fundamental rights.45 Justice Powell, in his
concurring opinion, noted this when he argued that the right to marry could be
regulated and traditionally had been; it was only the breadth of the statute’s
requirements that violated Due Process, in effect questioning the majority’s
position that treated the statutory classification as subject to an Equal Protection
rather than a Due Process analysis.46 In effect, the Court was claiming that it
was because the interest was fundamental, and not the class being suspect, that
brought this case under the Equal Protection clause.47 Perhaps the Court thought
this was necessary given that noncompliance for child support was hardly a
recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classification.
II. PLYLER V. DOE
Plyler v. Doe raises a different but also very interesting and related question
because it applied a higher level of scrutiny to a group that would otherwise not
have been considered a suspect class.48 This was a consolidated case involving
undocumented Mexican children residing in the state of Texas who sought to
enjoin the Tyler Independent School District from excluding them from the
public schools following the Texas legislature’s decision to withhold public
funds for the education of children who could not show that they were legally in
the United States.49 The issue before the Court was “whether, consistent with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to
undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provides to
children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.”50 In
deciding the case, the Court seemed to apply heightened scrutiny by noting that
any “denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state
interest.”51
What is of particular interest here is the rationale that the Court relied upon in
reaching its decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan began by noting
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 388.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 399–400 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 390.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
Id. at 230.
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that “[s]heer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this
country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment
of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow
population’ of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our
borders.”52 This, in turn, gives rise to “the specter of a permanent caste of
undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source
of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes
available to citizens and lawful residents.”53 The Court then went on to state
that “[t]he children . . . in these cases are special members of this underclass”
because, unlike their parents who “‘have the ability to conform their conduct to
societal norms’ and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the
State’s jurisdiction,” these children do not.54
At the same time, the Court wanted to make clear that while it was not
deviating from a prior holding that “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’ granted to
individuals by the Constitution[,] . . . neither is it merely some governmental
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”55 The
significance of this acknowledgement should not be too quickly passed over, for
it opens a door to the idea that public education (because of its importance to
both individual and societal well-being) might be rightly afforded a greater
degree of protection under the Due Process clause, even if not characterized as
a fundamental right. Where the Court viewed a higher level of protection to be
warranted, the state is required to overcome more than a mere rational basis.
The normal Equal Protection route for the Court to take in this case would
have been to inquire whether undocumented aliens might constitute a suspect
class. If they were a suspect class, strict scrutiny would apply on the basis of
that classification alone. But the Court would not go so far, stating, “Unlike
most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this
class, by virtue of entry into this country, is a product of voluntary action.”56
Instead, the Court went on to say that “more is involved in these cases than the
abstract question whether [this law] discriminates against a suspect class, or
whether education is a fundamental right.”57 In other words, neither a
fundamental rights analysis by itself, nor recognition as a member of a suspect
class by itself, was going to be the operant determinate of this case’s protection.
Instead, the operant determinate, at least in this case, was what happens when a
non-fundamental right, namely education, is distributed in a way that affects a
not quite suspect class of innocent children.58
52. Id. at 218.
53. Id. at 218–19.
54. Id. at 219–20.
55. Id. at 221 (holding there is no fundamental right to an education (citing San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973))).
56. Id. at 219 n.19.
57. Id. at 223.
58. See id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

2019]

At the Intersection of Due Process and Equal Protection

97

Here, the Court was taking into account certain salient facts. The law
in question imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children
not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will
mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic
education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our
civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will
contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. 59
The Court found, notwithstanding the fact these children may not constitute a
suspect class, that they nevertheless would likely suffer a great enduring harm if
the law were to continue to deny them the public education other children are
provided.60 The Court was also implying that such a harm would not only be
suffered by these children alone, but also by the Nation as a whole, which would
likely deny the future productive potential of these children.61 The latter might
be viewed as a policy question rather than a principled question, given that it is
usually up to the legislature to decide what is good for society through
lawmaking.62 Still, because this particular policy question was not independent
of the harm caused to innocent children and was also not one they or their parents
would likely have the political power to overcome (given that they and their
parents are undocumented), it could not be left unabated by simply saying the
children did not constitute a suspect class. So, the Court imposed a heightened
scrutiny requirement holding that “[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of
innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children
residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it
furthers some substantial state interest.”63 In Plyler, Texas failed to satisfy such
a showing, as its statute was not congruous with the intent of federal immigration
law,64 was unlikely to provide an effective method to discourage illegal
immigration,65 and alleged saving of resources was not shown to “provide highquality public education.”66 Instead, it would be more likely to create a subclass
of unemployable illiterates, only “adding to the problems and costs of
59. Id. at 223.
60. See id. at 221.
61. See id.
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Professor Ronald Dworkin distinguishes polices from
principles as follows:
I call a ‘policy’ that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an
improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community (though
some goals are negative, in that they stipulate that some present feature is to be protected
from adverse change). I call a ‘principle’ a standard that is to be observed, not because
it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.
Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
63. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
64. Id. at 226.
65. Id. at 228.
66. Id. at 229.
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unemployment, welfare, and crime.”67 The Court apparently thought this set of
interrelated factors should make the policy choice subordinate to the principle
concern of the unfairness of the harm being done to innocent children. This
latter concern clearly raises a question of material justice.68
In this regard, it is interesting to note that in his separate concurring opinion,
joined by Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun wrote:
[C]lassifications involving the complete denial of education are in a
sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection values
involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions. In
a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the
right to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class social
status; the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage. 69
This language is important when juxtaposed against the majority’s comment
that even if there is no fundamental right to an education, denial by the state of
the opportunity to receive an education is not merely denial of “some
governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation.”70 Moreover, as Justice Powell writes, “the exclusion of [these]
children from state-provided education is a type of punitive discrimination based
on status that is impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.”71 The latter
would not be of concern but for the underlying interest in public education that
the Court implied was like the right to vote in importance, and thus warranted
substantial protection.72
There was an important dissent by Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, which stated “the Court’s opinion rests on
such a unique confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for
little beyond the results in these particular cases.”73 The dissent questioned:
whether, for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a state has a
legitimate reason to differentiate between persons who are lawfully
within the state and those who are unlawfully there. The distinction
the State of Texas has drawn—based not only upon its own legitimate
interests but on classifications established by the Federal Government
in its immigration laws and policies—is not unconstitutional.74
The dissent then went on to suggest that “by patching together bits and pieces
of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights
analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 230.
T.D. Campbell, Rights Without Justice, 83 OXFORD UNIV. PRESS 445, 445–46 (1974).
Plyler, 547 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 243–44.
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cases.”75 Most specifically, the dissenters were criticizing what they saw as
judicial overreach into an area where the political branches are supposed to
operate.76 As the dissenters stated, “there are sound policy arguments against
the Texas Legislature’s choice [but that] does not render that choice an
unconstitutional one.”77
On the surface what the majority did might indeed appear at first glance to be
judicial overreach, as the dissent argued.78 However, that may depend on
whether the boundaries that the Constitution places on the political branches is
circumvented on the liberty side only by a limited set of rights previously
recognized as “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions.”79 This
would seem to accord with Supreme Court doctrine as previously described,
although it raises a question whether such doctrine might be under-inclusive
from a normative point of view. If other important rights are thought to exist,
even if not “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions,” a different
result might well be called for.80 Additionally, the correctness of the majority’s
opinion also depends on whether the existing categories for Equal Protection
concerns should continue to be limited to only those previously recognized by
the Court:81 race and ethnicity (strict scrutiny)82; gender and illegitimacy
(heightened or intermediate scrutiny)83; and, with some exceptions,84 everything
else determined under a rational basis standard of review, founded upon a
legitimate governmental interest.85 Should it be the case that these specified
classes are found to be too narrowly circumscribed, then that too should add
support for the Court’s decision in Plyler.
Prima facie, it seems arbitrary to believe that these and only these suspect
categories should bear significance, for each of these categories, at some point
in the Court’s development of its Equal Protection jurisprudence, came to be
recognized as areas where basic equality was being denied. Are these limitations
75. Id. at 244.
76. See id. at 243.
77. Id. at 253.
78. Id.
79. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
80. Id.; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
81. See United States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“It is unnecessary
to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.”) (emphasis added).
82. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979).
84. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18 (1982).
85. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
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really then as rigid as some, like the dissenters in Plyler, seem to suggest?86
What would be the normative argument for adopting that position? The rigidity
of these limitations will depend, in fact, on what theory of Due Process and
Equal Protection the Court adopts, not just for justifying its decisions in the
future, but also, and perhaps more importantly, on how it sees the two doctrines
operating together. For the present cases, it is sufficient that the Court was
willing to acknowledge the overlap of Due Process and Equal Protection as
jointly providing sufficient grounds for its decision. But how will its decision
here implicate future cases, if at all?
III. WHERE THE COURT’S CURRENT APPROACH TO CONNECTING DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION MISSES A BEAT IN THEORY, IF NOT IN FACT
Having seen how the Court generally analyzes Due Process and Equal
Protection cases, as well as some of the places where the justices disagree over
which standard of review (if any) the Court should apply in its analyses, it is
now worth affording some attention to a remark by Justice Kennedy in
Obergefell regarding the doctrines’ interconnection. 87 Kennedy’s statement is
particularly significant because nowhere does he directly cite Plyler, yet an idea
stemming from that case may nevertheless be operative in the background of
Obergefell, where Kennedy writes:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always
coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may
be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the
identification and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must
become.88
Justice Kennedy then discusses Loving and Zablocki to show how “the Equal
Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution
of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the
Constitution.”89 The possible significance of this comment should not be
missed. Was Kennedy suggesting that in some cases the Court needs to
investigate the way a right is defined or how it operates, as equality concerns
may arise at any of these separate points? What, more precisely, should be made
of his statement that each clause “may be instructive as to the meaning and reach
86.
87.
88.
89.

See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2604 (emphasis omitted).
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of the other[?]”90 Kennedy does not say. Still, on the surface, his language
sounds like an appropriate use of Equal Protection to reveal biases that may be
deeply hidden “within our most fundamental institutions that once passed
unnoticed and unchallenged.”91 At least, as seen from one point of view, Justice
Kennedy’s language affords a justification for correcting longstanding, existing
institutional arrangements that may harbor biases not previously identified and
challenged.92 However, especially if taken to suggest that any future violation
must simultaneously implicate both Due Process and Equal Protection concerns,
his language might also be construed to limit a more expansive recognition of
Due Process rights, since Kennedy does not say exactly how each “may be
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”93 Thus, the problem with
Justice Kennedy’s language is less with what he said and more with how little
he said. His discussion comes up short on exactly how, as a general matter, Due
Process and Equal Protection are to work together in any given case.
Consequently, when left without further comment, his language opens up more
questions than it answers.
Professor Mark Strasser, noting the Court’s earlier holding in Zablocki,
criticizes Justice Kennedy’s language for “leav[ing] open whether the due
process analysis (holding that the interest in marriage is fundamental) is in some
way dependent upon the finding that equal protection guarantees had been
violated.”94 Was it not the question before the Court whether the fundamental
interest in marriage included the right to marry someone of the same sex? Or
90. Id. at 2603 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Professor Connor M. Ewing has suggested that the line of Supreme Court cases involving
gays and lesbians from Lawrence v. Texas to United States v. Windsor to Obergefell suggests a
partial convergence “between liberty and equality, on the one hand, and human dignity, on the
other.” Connor M. Ewing, With Dignity and Justice for All: The Jurisprudence of Equal Dignity
and the Partial Convergence of Liberty and Equality in American Constitutional Law, 16 I-CON
753, 774 (2018) (I want to thank Professor Jona Goldschmidt of Loyola University Chicago for
bringing this Article to my attention). Ewing criticizes Laurence Tribe’s “legal double helix”
characterization as providing only “a static snapshot of what is, in fact, a dynamic process and an
incomplete convergence.” Id. (referencing Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004) and Laurence
H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2015)). Connor also criticizes
Kenji Yoshino’s discussion of Obergefell in A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges,
because it does not go far enough when it marginalizes the significance of dignity as it explains
how the Court “shifts the emphasis away from Glucksberg.” Id. at 772; Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth
of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147 (2015). My own view of the dignity
issue or what Professor Ewing calls “equal dignity,” which I will not be directly addressing in this
Article, is that it supervenes on a collective sense of personhood that is achieved when due process
and equal protection are aligned to allow for true human self-fulfillment. For then the person’s
own purpose fulfillment as a collective rational being, capable of making his or her own choices,
is being acknowledged.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Mark P. Strasser, Obergefell’s Legacy, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 61, 82–83
(2016).
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was Kennedy suggesting, if the equality concern in Obergefell that gays and
lesbians were denied the right to marry had been absent, the Court might have
never extended the right to marry to include same-sex couples? This might have
been the case if marriage as a fundamental right were perceived to be based
solely on its history and tradition as a heterosexist institution. Moreover,
Strasser notes that the Court’s language in striking down “unjustified inequality
. . . within our most fundamental institutions” also leaves open how it might act
on inequality claims where a mere liberty interest is at stake and not a
fundamental right.95 Specifically, although the Court decided in Obergefell that
both same sex and heterosexual couples have a fundamental right to marry, it
left open the question of how to decide a case involving long-term, non-marital
relationships, since there would be no Equal Protection trigger, provided gays
and straights are being treated similarly. Especially, if a future conservative
majority reads Lawrence v. Texas narrowly to only constitutionally undermine
the criminalization of same-sex relationships, then the liberty to have an
intimate, long-term, non-marital relationship might be afforded no special
protection at all. 96
Of course, this cannot be construed for sure by anything Justice Kennedy said.
Rather, the concern here is that a less sympathetic Court might be able to use
Justice Kennedy’s language both to refrain from any expansion of those
fundamental rights recognized under the Due Process clause or to hesitate from
elevating the level of scrutiny that might otherwise attach to groups invoking
less than fundamental liberty interests. By the same token, a more liberal Court
might use the same language to expand the liberty interests and equality
concerns it is willing to protect. Such differing possibilities provide, however,
little by way of prediction (let alone direction to lower courts) as to how future
cases should be decided, let alone offer much assurance to the public that rights
currently acknowledged will remain intact.
What is suggested by Professor Strasser’s concerns is the need to set out a
more robust theory of interpretation for how these two very different
perspectives, Due Process and Equal Protection, can be harmonized. Strasser’s
article shows, that in the absence of a more robust theory, the basic rights people
currently have may neither advance beyond their current state nor remain secure
in their current status, at least where no fundamental right or suspect or quasisuspect class is obviously present. Still, it should be remembered that the
requisite Fourteenth Amendment clauses do not speak of time-honored
traditions nor of statuses or even of basic rights generally but rather say, “nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”97 What is clear from both of these clauses is the Amendment’s focus on
95. Id. at 83–84 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)).
96. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–64 (2003).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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the person and the rights people may be deprived of or denied by the
government.
This suggests a possible avenue for determining the range of protected
interests that may arise from the apparent need to trigger heightened protection
under both Due Process and Equal Protection. The matter gets tricky where the
different choices appear equally satisfying to some members of the group
affected, but afford very different results to other members. In that instance,
numbers alone cannot resolve the issue since the matter is one of principle, not
policy. For example, arguments protecting the constitutionally enumerated
religious liberty right of a wedding cake baker to not make a wedding cake for
a same-sex couple may seem very satisfying and quite fair to ardent believers in
the sanctity of only opposite-sex marriage,98 but equally dissatisfying and unfair
to same-sex couples who are then denied this professional service because of
another person’s sincerely held religious belief. Nor would the result appear to
either party any differently by simply having to find another baker without the
same religious scruples. For the issue here is not just the denial of service by
the ardent believing baker, but of what such a denial would represent when
approved by society at large.99 This is only one example of where an appeal to
98. For a different perspective on the issues presented in the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision,
please see Kristen K. Waggoner, Mastering Masterpiece, 68. CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(author was lead counsel for cakemaker). Ms. Waggoner’s article will be part of a symposium
edition on religious liberty.
99. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
This case involved a cakemaker named Phillips who, in violation of the Colorado
Antidiscrimination Act, refused to sell a same-sex couple a wedding cake because of his religious
beliefs. Id. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reversed the Court of Appeals judgment against
Masterpiece Cakeshop, but only because of statements attributed to two Commissioners that
appeared in the record, which made it appear that the “Commission’s consideration of this case
[when it first came up] was inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality.” Id.
However, Justice Kennedy did note two considerations that would likely be present in any future
case. First, “the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity
of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek goods
and services.” Id. Second, “the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the
First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (emphasis
added). Justice Kennedy addressed a point this Article is committed to with regard to how we think
about fundamental rights, namely that the freedoms of speech and free exercise of religion raised
in this case, are “an instructive example . . . of the proposition that the application of constitutional
freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning.” Id. Justice Kagan,
joined by Justice Breyer, filed a separate concurrence stating that she viewed the Court’s remark
about the authority of Colorado law as able to protect gay people from discrimination just as it
protects other classes of people. Id. at 1734 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch, joined by
Justice Alito, disagreed, believing the product the vendor refused to sell was not a wedding cake
per se but a cake “celebrating same-sex marriage” suggesting it might well warrant free exercise
and free speech strict scrutiny protection. Id. at 1736–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
also filed a concurrence expressing the view that Phillips’s free speech claim with respect to a
wedding cake was consistent with “our free-speech jurisprudence.” Id. at 1746 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented, believing that Phillips’s
refusal to sell a wedding cake was distinguishable from two earlier cases involving cake refusals
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some further criterion of personhood would be most helpful if it were able to
assist in resolving conflict in an area of rights the law identifies (in this case, the
right to same-sex marriage and the free exercise of religion). Regrettably, such
a resolution is unlikely to be self-evident, since the conflict already implicates
important but different interests in which people with very different points of
view identify.
IV. THE INTERCONNECTION OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
Since the Fourteenth Amendment starts with similar wording to that of the
Fifth Amendment—”nor shall any State deprive any person of . . . liberty . .
.”100—it is only reasonable to recognize the existence of a general right to liberty
implicit in the constitutional order. The general nature of this right is implied
by the language of both Amendments that protects all persons’ rights to liberty.
Indeed, the philosopher H. L. A. Hart has noted the presumed existence of a
general natural right to liberty arises whenever any moral right is asserted (which
the Fourteenth Amendment does); this was evident when he said: “[I]f there are
any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal
right of all men to be free.”101 Since the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment both start with the premise of limiting the authority of the
government to interfere with individual liberty and states’ rights, except under
certain well-described circumstances (such as providing equal protection of the
laws), it follows that both of these documents presuppose inviolability and
liberty of the person.102 Indeed, if this were at all in doubt, both the Fifth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment say as much by stating that liberty
may not be denied “without due process of law[.]”103
After “saying that there is this [background natural] right [to be free],” Hart
goes on to describe what limits this natural right implies regarding other people’s
actions.104 Hart’s language here is consistent with the limits implied by the
that the Commission had allowed because the baker in those cases had refused to put certain
writings on anybody’s cake he felt would be derogatory of gay people and same-sex marriage. Id.
at 1750 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Here, Phillips had refused to sell wedding cakes for same-sex
couples. Id. at 1723. The dissenters also believed that there had been enough lower court review
to attenuate any lack of neutrality by the Commission or that might be attributed to inappropriate
statements by the two commissioners. Id. at 1751.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The relevant Fifth Amendment provision states: “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
101. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 175, 175 (1955).
102. See Bill of Rights, BILL OF RIGHTS INST., http://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/foundingdocuments/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018); see also David J. Shestokas, The Fourteenth
Amendment to the US Constitution, DAVID J. SHESTOKAS (Jan. 19, 2014),
http://www.shestokas.com/constitution-educational-series/the-us-constitutions-fourteenthamendment/;
U.S.
Constitution—5th
and
14th
Amendments,
FINDUSLAW,
https://finduslaw.com/us-constitution-5th-14th-amendments (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
103. U.S. CONST. amends V, XIV.
104. Hart, supra note 101, at 175.
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Ninth and Tenth Amendments for government (when no enumerated right of the
people or power of the government is involved).105 Hart explains:
I mean in the absence of certain special conditions which are
consistent with the right being an equal right, any adult human being
capable of choice (1) has the right to forbearance on the part of all
others from the use of coercion or restrain against him save to hinder
coercion or restraint and (2) is at liberty to do (i.e., is under no
obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or
restraining or designed to injure other persons.106
The acknowledgment by the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment that liberty cannot be removed without Due Process of law by itself
should be sufficient to afford constitutional recognition of a background natural
right to liberty, absent some special limitation required by Due Process or the
existence of other enumerated rights or powers. Still, if any doubt remains, it is
put to rest by the existence of both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Ninth
Amendment states: “The enumeration in this Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”107 The
Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”108 Together, these final two amendments of the
Bill of Rights articulate the presumed existence of a general, constitutionally
acknowledge natural right to liberty, even if not explicitly identified.
Given this analysis, it now makes sense to inquire under what conditions this
natural right to liberty might be circumscribed. And, relatedly, for those specific
enumerated liberties that are protected, are there any circumstances in which
they too might properly be circumscribed for the sake of protecting background
natural liberty more generally?109 This is discussed below in the Section on
conflict of rights. For now, the importance of raising Hart’s discussion of natural
rights is to show that this is not strictly a positivist question to be resolved simply
by what the framers might have expected at the time they drafted the
amendments. That is because it draws a logical connection between moral
language as described by Hart and specific constitutional provisions that cannot
be easily ignored if the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are to be

105. The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IX. The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
106. Hart, supra note 101, at 175.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
109. Free Exercise of Religion: Rise of the Compelling State Interest Test, EXPLORING CONST.
CONFLICTS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/freeexerciserise.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2018).
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thought of as creating ongoing normative obligations, separate from any
obliging out of fear or compulsion.110
So, how should conflicts of rights, as described at the end of the last Section,
get decided? Certainly, one way to decide the matter, at least where a
fundamental right is involved, is to inquire whether the state has a compelling
interest.111 This can be problematic, such as when a state’s compelling interest
is merely to ensure the conditions by which another’s right, such as the right of
a same-sex couple to the benefits of marriage, is manifested against those who
may have a religious, and arguably protected, reason for not wanting to afford
recognition. In such a situation, it might appear that the state is arbitrarily
supporting one fundamental right over another by its asserted compelling
interest claim. In short, it may appear as if the state is just taking sides in a
“culture war.” To avoid this criticism, a common denominator should be found
in such conflict of rights situations in order to determine which right should
govern if the resolution adopted is to be accepted. The problem becomes even
more acute, however, when the rights conflict is not between two liberty
interests, which are likely to have common ground in affirming personal
autonomy,112 but rather pits interests in liberty against a separate interest in
110. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 5–6 (2d ed. 1861).
According to John Austin, positivism traditionally claimed that laws were commands backed by a
threat of evil for nonconformance. Id. H. L. A. Hart would later amend this view to hold that laws
create obligations, although not necessarily moral obligations. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 83 (2d ed. 1961). In his essay, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Justice Scalia argues that
in interpreting the Constitution he looks for the “original meaning of the text, not what the original
drafters intended.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 38 (1997). Professor Ronald Dworkin, however, takes exception to Justice Scalia’s point.
Dworkin claims that Justice Scalia’s method of constitutional interpretation is not focused on
“‘semantic’ originalism” but “‘expectation’ originalism,” what the framers expected to be the
results of what they wrote. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 119 (1997). Indeed, had the framers meant constitutional
interpretation to focus on what they expected, they would not have used the abstract language used
in some parts of the Bill of Rights, like the Eighth Amendment’s language of “‘cruel and unusual’
punishments,” but would have limited themselves to more concrete language, like in Article II
where they wrote that the president must be at least 35 years of age and “natural born.” See id. at
120–22. Still, Justice Scalia argued back, “The Americans of 1791 . . . were embedding in the Bill
of Rights their moral values, for otherwise all its general and abstract guarantees could be brought
to naught.” Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 146 (1997).
111. Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 109.
112. Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. § 3.1
(Jan. 9, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/.
The authors write:
The conception of the autonomous person plays a variety of roles in various constructions
of liberal political theory . . . . Principally, it serves as the model of the person whose
perspective is used to formulate and justify political principles, as in social contract
models of principles of justice . . . . Also (and correspondingly) it serves as the model
of the citizen whose basic interests are reflected in those principles, such as in the claim
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equality, as in cases where Due Process and Equal Protection interests are both
present. In such cases, the two interests do not appear readily reconcilable since
they are not the same either in what they describe nor in how they operate. This
gives rise, as Cass Sunstein has noted, to believe that the two interests operate
on very different tracks.113
Still, the two interests may be reconcilable if they can be shown to operate, at
least in some instances, together. It is true that Due Process may initially appear
to look backward to history and tradition. Equal Protection, however, appears
to look forward to removing hidden biases not previously recognized.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that concerns for protecting liberty and equality can
also cross paths without necessarily opposing one another, provided that neither
could fully operate without the attention of the other.114 In Hart’s language, any
limitations of a right must be “consistent with the right being an equal right.”115
This is one important way, and certainly the way of most interest here, in which
liberty and equality interests operate together. It also helps explain the Court’s
decision in Obergefell, where heterosexual couples would not lose the right to
marry by extending the right to marry to same-sex individuals.116
A problem arises, however, where there is likely to be a loss felt by some party
because another’s right governs, as, for example, when religious freedom
confronts a state sponsored non-discrimination public accommodations statute
adopted in service to equality.117 Here, Due Process and Equal Protection may
appear particularly difficult to interconnect because they seem to send different
messages. Provided an appropriate foundation for the two rights can be found,
even though the duties themselves operate in a somewhat different fashion, the
deontological nature of both interests in looking backward to the duties people

that basic liberties, opportunities, and other primary goods are fundamental to flourishing
lives no matter what moral commitments, life plans, or other particulars of the person
might obtain.
Id.
113. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1163.
114. In Loving v. Virginia, the Court first held that Virginia’s miscegenation statute violated
Equal Protection by criminalizing a marriage between a white person and a nonwhite as “designed
to maintain White Supremacy.” 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). The Court then held marriage to be a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 12.
115. Hart, supra note 101, at 175.
116. Eric DuVall, Same-sex Marriage Rate Lower than Rate for Straight Couples, Poll Shows,
UPI (June 23, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2017/06/23/Same-sexmarriage-rate-lower-than-rate-for-straight-couples-poll-shows/8651498232582/.
117. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission in Opposition
at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16111); Brief in Opposition at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
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are thought to have should provide a basis for determining which duties take
precedence in any particular case.118
In other words, a right to religious freedom may at first appear to promote
equality by allowing everyone with sincerely held religious beliefs to
discriminate when providing services. That is until it confronts an existing right
to service, such as a non-discrimination ordinance, that cannot be ignored if the
underlying liberty (e.g., same-sex marriage) is to be sustained. If a right to be
served exists, because without it the underlying liberty would not exist or only
very narrowly exist, then, at the point where not everyone has access to be
served, the two rights conflict and a choice has to be made. The issue for the
deontologist is how to make the choice. It would be more simple if the matter
could be handled by some utilitarian calculation, which is teleological in nature
and generally forward looking toward some end or purpose thought to provide
greater utility or happiness to all those who would likely be affected by the
choice. Issues regarding the common good, at least when framed in economic,
cultural, and political terms, are generally forward looking in this way, and are
generally distinguishable from deontological claims involving justice, fairness,
or the recognition of basic liberties.119 Even if one could make a utilitarian
argument, a deontological claim might still arise if legislation initially thought
to confer a benefit is seen as manifestly unfair because it denies some people
access to the benefit at issue.120 Additionally, while teleological claims in a
democracy are generally thought to be under the purview of the legislature, and

118. Ethical theories get divided between those said to be deontological (like Divine Command
Theory and Kantianism) and those that are teleological (like Natural Law and Utilitarianism).
Deontological and Teleological Assumptions in Normative Ethics, REGIS UNIV. (Oct. 19, 2018),
http://rhchp.regis.edu/hce/ethicsataglance/DeontologicalTeleological/DeontologicalTeleological_
01.html; Deontological Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/. Deontological comes from the Greek word
“deon” referring to origin or duty. Deontological Ethics, supra note 118. Teleological comes from
the Greek word “teleos” referring to end or goal. Deontological and Teleological Assumptions in
Normative Ethics, supra note 118. As a consequence, deontological theories are backward looking
to the sources of the duty. See Deontological Ethics, supra note 118. Teleological theories are
forward looking toward evaluating the results of the actions taken. Deontological and Teleological
Assumptions in Normative Ethics, supra note 118.
119. As Brian Barry has noted:
[I]t is not an accident that we have different concepts; they really do have different jobs.
We have one set which points out various distributive comparisons, such as justice,
fairness, equity, equality . . . . And we have another set which points out the results of
various methods of aggregation, such as the ‘public interest’, ‘common good’, and
‘general welfare’ (‘good’ and ‘interest’ for example require one to include different ways
in which people are affected).
Brian M. Barry, Justice and the Common Good, 21 ANALYSIS 86, 89 (1961).
120. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding “to deny a discrete group of innocent
children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that
denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest”).
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to be decided on an utilitarian aggregation121 as they are in service to the
common good,122 principled claims—especially those involving justice and
fairness, or the Constitution and its meaning, along with how the political
departments might be restricted when fundamental rights are involved—are
generally the province of the courts to resolve on a principled basis, often in
terms of what serves personal autonomy generally.123
Regarding where the deontologist might begin, it was noted earlier, following
Hart, that a natural right to liberty—a right that presumably would apply equally
to all—is presupposed by the existence of moral rights whose purpose is to limit
some natural liberties.124 Such moral rights may also occasionally set forth
claims that appear to conflict with other moral rights. For example, claims of
justice and fairness find their grounds in the distributions of benefits or
detriments and may in some circumstances require limiting someone’s
freedom.125 Since both moral rights generally, and justice and fairness as a
particular kind of moral right, are backward looking to initiating conditions,
neither is solely concerned with consequences, and and any conflict between
them must be resolved on their ability to promote mutual autonomy.126 And this
is where a common denominator might be found in a person’s natural
background right to liberty now properly understood as serving mutual
121. It is a utilitarian belief “that the purpose of morality is to make life better by increasing
the amount of good things (such as pleasure and happiness) in the world and decreasing the amount
of bad things (such as pain and unhappiness)” either by way of individual acts (Act Utilitarianism)
or types of acts (Rule Utilitarianism). Stephen Nathanson, Act and Rule Utilitarianism, INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). But one
might ask how often legislatures have adopted, e.g., antiabortion laws aimed at making a moral
statement without considering all the consequences of the legislation. See generally Vincent J.
Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 287, 289–302 (2017)
(providing a brief history of the abortion debate).
122. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution provides a list of enumerated powers vested in
Congress and also suggests implied powers by way of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
123. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803). The case held:
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law;
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
very essence of judicial duty.
Id. See also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 44 (James Madison); The
Court
and
Constitutional
Interpretation,
SUPREME
COURT
OF
THE
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
124. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 27 (1978).
125. See, e.g., Compelling-State-Interest-Test Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/compelling-state-interest-test/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
126. VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
87 (1991). Samar writes, “By individual autonomy, I mean that the conditions that govern a
person’s participation in a rule-governed activity are only those conditions that are set by the
activity itself.” Id. at 86–87.
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autonomy.127 In other words, Hart’s language against using “coercion and
restraint” applies just as equally to prevent background claims to natural liberty
from ever being used as a constraint to undermine mutual autonomy as it does
to undermining individual autonomy.128 This is also the place where Due
Process liberty rights and Equal Protection claims appear to cross hairs.
The fact that both Due Process and Equal Protection engage liberty and
equality claims that are fundamentally deontological would seem to suggest that
they might have a common basis for resolution by promoting overall individual
autonomy for all concerned in the sense of promoting mutual self-fulfillment.
However, because the messages that Due Process and Equal Protection send, as
Sunstein notes, appear to operate on different tracks, resolving conflicts between
the two may not be obvious. Perhaps, the problem Sunstein is identifying lies
not with the difficulty of the resolution, but with how fundamental liberty claims
have traditionally been described. As Sunstein states, Due Process claims
address liberties thought to be long-standing.129 By contrast, Equal Protection
claims unearth biases that may only now be publicly recognized. In fact, both
operate in common service to individuals being collectively able to fulfill their
various ambitions, desires, and worthiest capacities, and therefore both may find
the condition of their resolution not so much (or perhaps even at all) in history
and tradition, which may serve only as a guide, but in what truly serves to create
human self-fulfillment collectively understood.130 But, if this is so, it raises the
question: how should this notion of personhood’s self-fulfillment now be
exemplified to resolve actual conflicts of rights?
127. See, e.g., id. at 87. Samar argued, “All conflicts of rights involving privacy can be
resolved by an appeal to maximal autonomy.” Id. at 104. Also, “[t]he protection of autonomy is
relevant to deciding whether an interest the state seeks to protect is truly more compelling than
privacy.” Id. at 112. This general claim about privacy can be applied to other “active” and
“passive” rights in which the former “are those that permit the holder of the right to perform an
action [free from outside interference], such as making a speech, publishing a newspaper report, or
practicing a particular religious belief.” Id. at 104. While the latter
are those that afford the subject a benefit, such as a trial by his or her peers, a speedy and
public trial, the right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of witnesses, and the
right to the assistance of counsel. Passive rights involve positive freedom in the sense
that the respondent of the right has the duty to afford the holder certain benefits.
Id. at 104–05. Together the two types of rights when put into the proper balance can serve to
promote maximal autonomy and individual self-fulfillment.
128. Hart, supra note 101, at 175.
129. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1163.
130. One definition of self-fulfillment defines it as “the act or fact of fulfilling one’s ambitions,
desires, etc., through one’s own efforts.”
Self-Fulfillment, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/self-fulfillment (last visited Aug. 19, 2018). Alan Gewirth has
noted:
[T]here is a general conception of it which can give an initial idea of why self-fulfillment
has so often been highly valued as a primary constituent, or indeed as the inclusive
content, of a good, happy human life. According to this conception, self-fulfillment
consists in carrying to fruition one’s deepest desires or one’s worthiest capacities.
ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 3 (1998).
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Personhood’s self-fulfillment defies simple identification, as it encompasses
by virtue of its ability when construed both individually and collectively, to
include both liberty of the person and equal treatment of all those similarly
situated, and is not necessarily limited by citizenship.131 This is manifested by
personhood’s failure to be just limited to maximizing individual liberty (the
individualistic or libertarian position),132 but also includes the full range of
interests that must be provided if liberty is to be extended (the more egalitarian
position).133 John Rawls’s egalitarian view of justice identifies this latter
claim.134 In this sense, personhood’s self-fulfillment engages two types of
deontological claims in ongoing dialogue with one another. Due Process
identifies the first of these two types of claims: liberties that may have been long
valued, or perhaps are only now showing themselves to be strongly cared about
because they attach to important aspects of human identity. Equal Protection
identifies the second of these two types of claims, by comparing how fairly the
Due Process liberties are actually distributed among individuals.135 The two do
operate on different tracks, but apparently only in opposition to one another until
personhood’s self-fulfillment takes on this collective sense.

131. See Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 INT’L J. OF CONST .
L. 9, 9 (2010).
132. Jan Narveson argues for the libertarian position that people “do have a general right to
liberty and consequently do not have a fundamental right to equality, of any interesting kind.” Jan
Naverson, Liberty and Equality—A Question of Balance, in ETHICS: THE BIG QUESTIONS 271
(James Sterba ed., 2nd ed. 2002). Also, “A positive right to liberty would entail on all of us the
duty to promote liberty—not just the duty to respect it.” Id. at 276. Indeed, Naverson argues
against claims of equal opportunity stating that “no one may intervene to prevent people from taking
legitimate opportunities they have been, or are, freely offered.” Id. at 282.
133. See Bosniak, supra note 131, at 25–29.
134. In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls sets out two principles of justice he believes
would be chosen in an “original position of equality [that] corresponds to the state of nature in the
traditional theory of the social contract.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF J USTICE 208 (1971). Rawls
continues and states:
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society,
his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume
that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological
propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.
Id. Under these circumstances, Rawls argues:
[T]he persons in the initial situation would choose two rather different principles: the
first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds
that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority,
are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for
the least advantaged members of society.
Id. at 210.
135. See id.
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Due Process remains relevant and substantive in that it discovers specific
rights people might need to obtain self-fulfillment.136 Equal protection operates
comparatively to ensure the rights Due Process identifies are fairly
distributed.137 In this sense, equal protection operates by comparing rights
holders without necessarily identifying the right being held. However, because
the right being held may itself be described in a manner that hides an unfair
distribution, like when marriage is identified as operating only between same
race or opposite-sex persons, Equal Protection can invalidate the limitation to
ensure a fair distribution.138 In this sense, Equal Protection prevents descriptions
of rights that on their face would prevent, absent adequate justification, a fair
distribution of the essential aspects of the liberty to which all are entitled.139 It
may also invalidate penalties designed to restrict liberty by denying benefits
where the only purpose for the denial is to maintain a “neutral rule” of general
applicability that is claimed to be in service to the common good, but in fact may
not be so.140 Such neutral rules raise concerns when they appear to impinge
upon areas of personal privacy or religious liberty with little or no evidence
showing how they implicate the greater good of society, such as might be the
case where one makes use of a drug as part of a religious or artistic ritual under
circumstances where its effect is unlikely to burden the society at large.141 That
personhood in this collective sense might be helpful to afford greater liberty even
against society’s neutral rules of general applicability, is especially important to
recognize when no issue of equality is likely to arise but personal autonomy and
the desire to live a self-fulfilled life may still be very much at stake.
V. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS
Now arises the practical question: how do we relate personhood’s selffulfillment to resolving actual conflicts of rights where the real debate is between
136. See Substantive Due Process, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/substantive_due_process (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
137. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1962) (finding that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring an Equal Protection challenge to a 1901 Tennessee statute that unfairly
apportioned seats in the General Assembly).
138. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (2015) (describing how the
understanding of the institution of marriage has changed with the end of coverture, among other
changes).
139. See id. at 2603. Justice Kennedy, referring to the holding in Zablocki v. Redhail, stated,
“the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis for invalidating the challenged law,
which, as already noted, barred fathers who were behind on child-support payments from marrying
without judicial approval.” Id. (emphasis added).
140. See Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
141. See id. at 881. As a result of this decision, both Congress and many state legislatures
adopted Religious Freedom Restoration statutes to ensure religious liberty is only impinged upon
where a compelling state interest is present and the intrusion is narrowly drawn. See generally
Federal
Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act
Overview,
FINDLAW,
http://civilrights.findlaw.com/discrimination/federal-religious-freedom-restoration-actoverview.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
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individual liberty and equality for all? Professor Alan Gewirth has argued that
the prescriptive nature of morality presupposes that any moral theory addresses
moral agents in the sense of being voluntary purposive actors.142 Indeed, if these
features were not part of moral agency, moral theories would be at a loss in
explaining moral responsibility, since such claims presuppose that the persons
addressed are capable of making choices.143 Indeed, central to claims of criminal
responsibility, certainly in most American jurisdictions, is the assurance that
individual choices are voluntary, and not just the consequence of some mental
illness.144 Elsewhere, Gewirth has argued that the notion of moral agency better
explains the sense of person in debates over the moral and legal status of
abortion, at least, if one resides in a pluralistic society that follows no single
moral or religious doctrine.145 What is of significance for the discussion here is
to recognize how personhood in the collective sense, as coextensive with the
aforesaid definition of moral agents, can aid the resolution of conflicts between
Due Process and Equal Protection concerns.
Moral agency operates to identify normal adult human beings as voluntary,
purposive human actors, who make choices to act for their own benefit because
they see their choice as affording some level of self-fulfillment.146
Consequently, such choices necessarily presuppose that the person is both free
to act and has the capacity to perform and carry out at least some actions.147
Specifically, on the voluntary side of personhood, freedom from outside
interference is essential as “it concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing
events.”148 Here, human freedom operates procedurally to allow human beings
the greatest range of action.149 This notion of human freedom also accords with
the purposiveness side as the other identifying ingredient of human action.
Purposiveness plays a substantive role in that it “comprises the object or goal of
the action in the sense of the good [the agent] wants to achieve or have through
this causation.”150 Thus, freedom to choose where one’s physical, mental, or
economic abilities prevent actually carrying out the choice is not much of a
freedom of choice. This suggests that well-being, physical, mental, and
economic abilities are equally essential to any action that one might

142. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 27.
143. See id. at 26–27.
144. See, e.g., The ‘Model Penal Code’ Test for Legal Insanity, FINDLAW,
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/the-model-penal-code-test-for-legal-insanity.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
145. See Vincent J. Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MARQ. L. REV.
287, 320–21 (2017).
146. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 27.
147. See id. at 27–28.
148. Id. at 41.
149. See id. at 31, 41.
150. Id. at 41.
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undertake.151 Such well-being might be said to first require the absence of
external impediments to one’s choice.152 As such, this is as much about ensuring
the voluntariness of the action as it is about the individual purposes that give it
rise. Beyond this, there will be situations where the possibility of choice will
need assistance from education, health care, a decent standard of living, and
more for purposes to even emerge.153 What duties are there to provide this
assistance and what obligations are there to be free of external interference are
what one would hope that a good moral theory and a good theory of political
liberalism would make clear. This is also the place where libertarian and
egalitarian views of the person must cease being at odds and find common
ground in order for personhood to truly become self-fulfilling.
Gewirth’s derivation for a supreme principle of morality can provide an
analogous set of solutions for resolving Due Process and Equal Protection
claims, whether one adopts his supreme principle of morality or not.154 Of
particular significance in Gewirth’s derivation are his arguments for relating
liberty and equality concerns in a way that might well define the relationship
between Due Process an Equal Protection.155 This is made clear by the argument
he sets forth for the derivation of the principle of morality and the way it works
to resolve conflict of rights cases. Gewirth’s arguments for the derivation of a
supreme principle of morality, which he calls the “Principle of Generic
Consistency,” or “PGC” for short, starts from within the internal conative
standpoint of the agent (that is, any voluntary purposive actor), and proceeds to
explicate what the agent qua agent would logically have to agree to, from her
own point of view, on pain of contradiction.156 His argument is summarized as
follows:
1. Every agent by performing any voluntary act presupposes the
action is good for some purpose of her own.157
2. Since performing any such action necessarily presupposes that the
agent has the freedom and well-being to perform it, from the agent’s
point of view she claims rights to freedom and well-being, as
necessary to her action being voluntary and purposive respectively.158
3. Indeed, since the rights being asserted are claim rights, if the agent
were to deny she had these rights, then from within her own internal
151. Gewirth takes particular note “that the agent [must] act in accord with the generic rights
of his recipients and not all of mankind[.]” Id. at 201. In doing so, he must “take favorable account
of his recipients’ wishes, since the recipient normally does not want to be coerced or to undergo
deterioration of his abilities to have basic, nonsubtractive, and additive goods.” Id. at 202–03.
152. See id. at 207–08.
153. See id. at 208–10.
154. See generally id. at 206–07.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 44–45 (discussing the “Dialectically Necessary Method”).
157. Id. at 48.
158. Id.
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connotative standpoint she would be admitting other persons are
permitted to prevent her from having these same rights and that
consequently she may not have these rights at all.159
4. But such an admission would be in contradiction to the agent’s own
action, since the agent’s performance implies she must have freedom
and well-being. Thus, at least from within the agent’s point of view,
the rights to freedom and well-being are necessarily being claimed
whenever she performs any action for any purpose of her own.160
But this is not the end of the story according to Gewirth. If it were, all he
would have achieved is an egoistic/prudentialist view for rights claims in which
prudential claims are set out, but in no way could resolve likely conflicts
between claims of different persons.161
Next, as a rational actor the agent realizes that any other agent, that is, any
other person wanting to do some action for some purpose, would claim these
same rights and there is nothing special to distinguish her from any other agent
insofar as she is an agent.162 Here is where the collectivist notion of personhood
begins to assert itself. If there is nothing to distinguish this agent from any other
agent, then presumably any agent seeking to perform any action for any purpose
would be just as entitled to make these same rights claims.163 Consequently, if
the agent denied her fellow agents’ rights on the same basis she affirms for
herself, she would be impliedly saying, “I have rights because I am a prospective
purposive agent; you don’t have rights, even though you are a prospective
purposive agent, where the sufficient reason for having these rights is just being
a prospective purposive agent.”164 That position, Gewirth points out, would also
be a contradiction; so, Gewirth believes that logically any agent is compelled to
accept, as the supreme principle of morality, “Act in accord with the generic
rights [to freedom and well-being] of your recipients as well as yourself.”165 In
further describing his principle, Gewirth notes that it is categorically necessary
because an agent who has gone through this dialectically necessary procedure

159. Id. See also Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, YALE L. S CH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 710, 716 (1964) (arguing that the
word “right” in the law, when used nominatively, can apply to claim rights, liberties, powers, or
immunities, and so it is important to ensure the sense of any particular use); Hart, supra note 101,
at 183.
160. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 78–82.
161. See generally id. at 107–08.
162. Id. at 109–10.
163. Id. at 112.
164. Id. at 115–19 (dealing with the individuality objection by way of a direct discourse
illustrating a first-person perspective)); see generally DERYCK BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL
NECESSITY OF MORALITY: AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF ALAN GEWIRTH’S ARGUMENT TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY (1991); GEWIRTH’S ETHICAL RATIONALISM: CRITICAL
ESSAYS WITH A REPLY BY ALAN GEWIRTH (Edward Regis Jr. ed., 1984).
165. GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 135 (emphasis omitted).
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would come to exactly the same conclusion on pain of contradiction.166 For this
reason, he states, it is fair to describe the PGC not just as a dialectically derived
principle, but also as an assertoric principle or, in other words, a statement of
moral fact.167
Putting aside possible philosophical debates over whether Gewirth has, by his
method, finally achieved a supreme categorical principle of morality, he has
certainly explained why any agent from within her own point of view cannot
rationally claim rights to freedom and well-being for herself without also
recognizing that all other agents could rationally make these very same rights
claims.168 Moreover, because Gewirth’s argument proceeds without begging
any questions, as would likely happen if his argument were grounded in a
particular religious or cultural tradition, it can legitimately claim a greater
universality than more particularistic religious or culturally-based moralities.
For this reason, the argument provides a rational foundation for human rights
generally, and the civil liberties afforded by the U.S. Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment particularly.169
The argument logically requires that each agent views herself and every other
agent as similarly situated. This in particular should make it attractive as a useful
guide in discussions concerning Equal Protection jurisprudence where being
similarly situated is a key concern. Even if it were the case that the theory
somehow failed to logically compel the mutual recognition of agents’ rights,
certainly the idea of “rule of law” as binding generally on all persons, including
when grounded on principles recognized by the international community,
implies a general public equality and the recognition of equal rights among all
persons.170 This also fits within Hart’s argument that a background, general,
166. Id. at 133.
167. Id. at 161.
168. See generally id. at 109–10.
169. Allen Buchanan writes:
It is often said that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various human
rights treaties that followed it wisely avoided attempting a justification for the norms they
asserted. To paraphrase the philosopher Jacques Maritain, it was possible to agree on a
list of human rights only on the condition that almost nothing was said about how they
are grounded.
...
In the end, whether such a justification becomes available will depend not only upon the
further development of the moral foundations of the idea of human rights—a task which
until recently most contemporary moral and political philosopher, like most
internationalist legal theorists, have avoided—but also upon improvements in the global
public deliberative processes that occur within the complex array of institutions within
which human rights norms are articulated, contested, and revised over time.
Allen Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 96 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
170. The United Nations defines “rule of law” as follows:
The term rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions
and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are
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natural, and equal right to liberty exists whenever any moral right is claimed.171
Consequently, the rights that arise out of claims by moral agents as voluntary,
purposive actors, are just as relevant to issues involving conflicts related to the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, as they are to resolving moral
conflicts between liberty and equality. While the argument might not be the
whole truth of how constitutional questions are decided because constitutional
interpretation is fraught with debates over history and tradition,172 nevertheless,
it should provide a valuable resource for resolving rights conflicts between Due
Process and Equal Protection generally.
Between private individuals, Gewirth describes the way to handle conflicts
involving freedom claims by noting that the freedom component of the PGC
involves personal consent, autonomy, and privacy of all persons as “equal
rights” holders.173 These three features, which are also features that play a role
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well,
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the
law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and
procedural and legal transparency.
James Goldston, Three Principles to Strengthen the Rule of Law, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS. (Jan. 26,
2012), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/three-principles-to-strengthen-the-rule-oflaw.
171. HART, supra note 110, at 183.
172. Constitutional law scholars, like the justices themselves, have long debated what the
various constitutional provisions mean and how they are to be interpreted. See, e.g., WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE J R., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 361–405 (2016) (discussing the various canons and norms that distinguish
constitutional from statutory interpretations); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 136 (2001) (arguing “that the United States, as a matter of fact and law, has an
unwritten as well as a written constitution. The unwritten constitution mediates the written
Constitution and, among other functions, substantially defines and ‘legitimates’ the Court’s role in
constitutional implementation.” Thus, it eliminates the Justices betraying their duty when they
“sometimes propound doctrines that result in ‘overenforcement’ and, more typically, in judicial
‘underenforcement’ of constitutional norms”); see generally SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 110 (accompanying commentaries by Gordon S. Wood, Laurence H.
Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin arguing for and against Scalia’s originalist
interpretation of constitutional norms being like statutory norms). Philip Bobbit demands, based
on an earlier work:
[T]hat “Constitutional law must be able to provide good reasons, rather than mere
preferences, for choosing among alternative outcomes generated by the operation of the
various forms of argument” [prudential, structural, ethical and historical]. But is this
reasonable sounding demand really necessary? I think it depends upon a frequent
confusion between how we know that we know something (the subject of epistemology)
and what in fact we know when we know something (the subject matter of ontology).
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xvi (1991).
173. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 256. Privacy, here in context to both a private act and
a private state of affairs, provides respectively the ideal case examples of where individual freedom
should not be interfered without further inquiry because, prima facie, no interest of another appears
to be infringed. See also SAMAR, supra note 126, at 68–69, 97, 103.

118

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:87

in substantive Due Process considerations, define a level of freedom in a most
basic sense where no other interest is presupposed.174 Similarly, on the wellbeing side, Gewirth defines three levels of well-being in their respective order
of importance to purpose-fulfillment.175 The first and most essential level of
well-being, which Gewirth calls “basic,” involves life, physical integrity, and
mental equilibrium.176 This is the most essential aspect of well-being because
without these features, a person could not be an agent, that is, a voluntary
purposive actor.177 The second most important level is “non-subtractive” wellbeing.178 Here, the concern is with the abilities and conditions necessary for
maintaining one’s current level of purpose fulfillment.179 An agent’s nonsubtractive well-being is affected when she is lied to, promises are broken, or
she is defrauded.180 The third level of well-being Gewirth calls “additive.”181 In
this level, the abilities and conditions required to increase one’s level of purpose
fulfillment are provided.182 Additive well-being is denied when one is not
provided decent health care, education, or a reasonable opportunity to improve
his economic wherewithal to advance from his current level of purpose
fulfillment.183 Thus, implied by the well-being component, are important
elements in service to guaranteeing equality beyond the existence of an “equal
right,” insofar as everyone needs to have these elements as they seek to manifest
their basic freedoms toward purpose-fulfillment.
Gewirth also points out how differences between freedom and well-being
might work to resolve conflicts of rights issues where liberty and equality might
appear to be in conflict.184 For example, in the case where a person would use
his freedom to attack the basic well-being of another, he necessarily creates a
transactional inconsistency by illogically implying his rights override those of
the other, even though, as an agent, his rights are no different from those of
another.185 Under such circumstances, the recipient is certainly justified in using
174. Id. at 67–68.
175. GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 53.
176. Id. at 54.
177. See id. at 211–13. Gewirth takes note that there are three distinct kinds of goods, which
he designates “as basic goods, nonsubtractive goods, and additive goods[,]” and states that
[e]ach of these is necessarily involved in all purposive action as viewed by the rational
agent, the first kind as its preconditions, the other two kinds as constitutive of his
purposes. Each of the three kinds of good is hence also involved in the value-judgments
that express his view of the goodness of the purposes for which he acts.
Id. at 54.
178. Id. at 230.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 238–39.
181. Id. at 240.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 240–49.
184. Alan Gewirth, The Basis and Content of Human Rights, 23 NOMOS 119, 125–28 (1981).
185. Id.
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all reasonable self-defense measures to protect his own well-being, provided his
actions are proportionate to the threat he seeks to overcome.186 But what about
conflicts of rights involving different levels of well-being, such as lying to
protect the basic rights of innocent people?187 In that case, because basic wellbeing is more important to being an agent than non-subtractive well-being, lying
to protect an innocent person is justified where there is no other way to guarantee
the person’s protection, such as by way of an impartial trial with Due Process
guarantees.188 A historical example of such a situation would be lying to the
Gestapo as to where a Jewish family might be hiding. Gewirth sees these two
resolutions of conflict of rights as where the PGC applies directly on individuals
to guide actions.189 For purposes of this Article, however, it is important to focus
on Gewirth’s third relevant area of conflict resolution, where he promotes the
construction and engagement of impartial governmental institutions, as defined
by the rule of law, to assist in the resolution of conflicts of rights more
generally.190
Because human agents are often biased by their own perspective, the creation
and use of impartial institutions, like courts and various forms of arbitration, the
PGC acknowledges, provided due process concerns are met, are better suited to
resolving conflicts that arise from personal self-interest.191 Here the freedom
component operates to provide protections for consent, privacy, and personal
autonomy. For example, this is done by protecting against forced membership
in voluntary organizations and by requiring existing governments, if they are to
be morally justified, to provide a means for consent to their decision procedures
by those subject to their law.192 On the well-being side, the PGC requires
governments and international organizations to work together to protect against
violations of basic rights wherever they might occur.193 It also requires that
governments do as much as possible to increase the well-being of their own
people to the maximum degree possible within their own means, as well as for
wealthier governments to aid poorer governments in developing the well-being
of their subjects, since all agents are morally the same in that they are voluntary
purposive human agents.194 Thus, one finds by way of the indirect applications
186. See id. at 137.
187. See id. at 138.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 139.
190. See id. at 139–40.
191. See id. at 139.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 140.
194. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS
206–208 (1982). See also ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 353 (1996) (arguing that
“[w]here governments do not have the will or the resources to fulfill the rights, they must be helped
by other governments, especially through facilitating processes of democratization and developing
in their own members the abilities of productive agency whereby they can provide the needed
resources for themselves”); see also IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A548/B576
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of the PGC moral grounds to support the original aspirations of the United
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights,195 but also for the subsequent
adoptions of the legally obligatory covenants to protect civil, political,196
economic, social, and cultural rights,197 as well as those involving the
elimination of discrimination based on race198or gender.199 Here, international
law provides, by way of formal treaty,200custom, and practice201 (that is, state
practice and opinio juris202), the ground for universalization between individual
and collective notions of the person at the international level. This latter
recognition is embodied in explicit and implied roles of equality as a separate
comparative means that international courts, like the International Court of
Justice, can use for evaluating liberty across cultures, at least where specific
treaty reservations, which themselves may sometimes be morally suspect, have
not been invoked.203
The liberty interests found under the PGC are interests presumably any agent
could advance because, facially, they do not interfere with the equal liberty of
other agents’ same basic rights or other highly valuable interests.204 Such basic
liberty interests, especially if they involve important roles that human beings are
inclined to identify with as a basis of their self-fulfillment, should be deemed
fundamental; particularly is this the case when these interests could not
otherwise be accommodated or could only be accommodated by alternative
means and only at great effort and expense.205 This is especially true on the
(1998) (noting “the action must be possible under natural conditions if the ought is directed to it”
(emphasis added)).
195. G.A. Res. 217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
196. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
197. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
198. G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) (Jan. 4, 1969).
199. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
200. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs 21.
201. Id. art. 38(1)(b).
202. See Opinio Juris (International Law), CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinio_juris_international_law (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
203. Article 2(1)(d) of The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as “a unilateral statement,
however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State[.]” Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 2(1)(d), Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
204. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 206.
205. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, to constitutionally protect
same-sex marriages in states where such marriages were not recognized, such protections could
only be obtained limitedly by powers of attorney, wills, and some other legal documents, but this
would never alter statutes affording benefits to only opposite-sex married couples. In some states,
Domestic Unions statutes were adopted that offered some marital rights; some other states
eventually adopted Civil Unions statutes where all the rights of marriage under state law were
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liberty side, where a particular liberty, like the right to marry, might be described
so as to deny access to the same right, or to deny what fundamentally makes it
of value to others. Consequently, as Hart has noted, imbedded in the idea of a
right, especially a liberty right, is the idea that it cannot be generally denied.206
But again, one has to be cautious, for the liberty right might be so described that
on the surface, it might appear to be generally accessible based on what the right
is, but in reality it limits those who would seek to make use of its essential
qualities because of how it is being defined. For example, if the right to marry
is defined to only include same-race or opposite-sex couples, then access by
interracial and same-sex couples to fundamental aspects of marriage—that
normally attach to couples with rights and duties to one another—will be denied
where a less restrictive definition would otherwise make these same aspects
available.207 In this instance, essential ingredients that make the marriage right
desirable, and not just attractive, are what is being denied, even though access
to the right is seemingly open to all.208
The other place in Gewirth’s system where equality takes root is where he
describes resolving conflict of rights involving different levels of well-being.209
Prevention or removal of transactional inconsistency when one person or group
attempts to use its rights to deny those same rights to another person or group is
an obvious case. Another place is where a tradeoff is offered between denying
a lesser good of well-being (such as, in the moral area, not lying) to offset a
greater good (such as life).210 Obviously, in the case of basic well-being, these
goods always trump non-subtractive or additive well-being; similarly, nonsubtractive well-being will usually trump additive well-being, although there
available but not its status and, of course, not any marital rights under federal law, which itself
prohibited recognition of same-sex marriage. What is a Domestic Partnership?, FINDLAW,
http://family.findlaw.com/domestic-partnerships/what-is-a-domestic-partnership (last visited Oct.
26, 2018). As a consequence, these statutes failed to provide all the protections of marriage since
they didn’t apply to the federal government and didn’t afford the same social status as marriage.
See Vincent J. Samar, Privacy and the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage Versus Unions, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 783, 785–91 (2005). The Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 752
(2013), relied on Equal Protection grounds to strike down Section 3 of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act, which provided:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. §7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.
744 (2013).
206. See Hart, supra note 101, 188–991.
207. The list of important aspects of marriage denied encompass matters of inheritance, family
law, health care decisions, adoption, spousal immunity, statutory entitlements (based on being
married), and more. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
208. See Samar, supra note 205, at 785.
209. GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 241.
210. Id. at 240.
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might be occasions where small amounts of non-subtractive well-being are
overcome by great improvements in additive well-being, such as by taxing all
citizens, regardless of whether they have children, to support public education
and thus enhance purpose fulfillment.211 Here the point is Kantian, not
utilitarian, in ensuring what is needed for basic autonomy and self-fulfillment is
not denied to the least advantaged.212
At the societal, legislative level, differences of degree must account for the
possibility that the degree of sacrifice of a seemingly greater degree of wellbeing may be comparatively small, if it applies to fewer persons on less than
fundamental issues and when juxtaposed against a far greater increase of
additive well-being involving many people on very important issues directly
affecting agency. Here, one might set the choice from behind a Rawlsian veil
of personal ignorance and ask whether, as rational beings, not knowing how it
will affect them personally, one would consent to the adjustment assuming a
statistical average amount of risk aversion as is appropriate to people living in a
given society?213 All of this suggests that a correct understanding of rights to
freedom and well-being, in the sense of adding to individual self-fulfillment
collectively, should help in the development of a framework where Due Process
and Equal Protection concerns can reasonably be reconciled. The two
considerations need not be posited as operating against one another, but instead
can be seen to operate together through a collective recognition in which
individual persons acknowledge the equal standing of one another in order to
achieve maximum self-fulfillment for all.214 This is the collective sense of
personhood that was sought after earlier, as necessary to resolve conflicts of
rights.215
VI. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
Given the forgoing, how might this philosophical background understand the
relationship of Due Process and Equal Protection? Recall that traditionally it
was thought that Due Process is backward looking toward discovering “an
existing or time-honored convention, described at the appropriate level of
211. Gewirth, supra note 184, at 141.
212. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (2009) (arguing that “social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity). Rawls claims that the original position from which these principles derive “may be
viewed, then, as a procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the categorical
imperative.” Id. at 226.
213. See generally id. at 15–18.
214. For Gewirth, “self-fulfillment is a maximizing conception; it consists in superlatives of
desire and achievement; it subsumes all other values of human life and is the ultimate goal of human
striving.” GEWIRTH, supra note 130, at 3. It is best understood not historically but rather
dialectically, analytically, and systematically. See id. at 5–6.
215. Id. at 3.
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generality.”216 By contrast, Equal Protection is forward looking “to invalidate
practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were
expected to endure.”217 In light of the discussion regarding liberty and equality,
both of these views should now be seen as somewhat misleading. What makes
the Due Process analysis work is not that the right described has a longstanding
history. Slavery had a longstanding tradition; that does not mean Due Process
should recognize a right to own slaves even absent the Thirteenth Amendment’s
adoption. While a longstanding history might aid the right’s recognition, a
failure to have a longstanding history should not mean the right does not exist.
If that were the case, both the Court’s decision in Loving, insofar as it was a Due
Process case, and Obergefell, would have been wrongly decided, for the issues
in those cases were not whether marriage was a fundamental right (though there
is case evidence to suggest that had long been believed),218 but whether state
marriage laws could limit the interpretation of marriage for whites to only marry
whites or for everyone (white or nonwhite) to only marry people of the oppositesex.219 Nor is this conclusion altered by saying that the Court’s determination
of the constitutionally appropriate level of generality for the right to marry
disallowed states from imposing these limitations. For the Court offered no
definite criteria for deciding what the appropriate level of generality is, at least
not before considering Equal Protection.220 And indeed, the level of generality
the Court was willing to consider may have changed over time.221
What makes the decision in these cases correct is that the fundamental right
involved, namely marriage, is unfettered from certain previous conventions that
had defined the institution of marriage. As such, the fundamental right described
216. Sunstein, supra note 4, 1163.
217. Id.
218. 14 Supreme Court Cases: Marriage is a Fundamental Right, AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL
RTS. (July 19, 2012), http://afer.org/blog/14-supreme-court-cases-marriage-is-a-fundamentalright/.
219. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). Justice Kennedy stated:
Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate framing of the issue, the respondents
refer to Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d
772 (1997), which called for a “‘careful description’” of fundamental rights. They assert
the petitioners do not seek to exercise the right to marry but rather a new and nonexistent
“right to same-sex marriage.” Brief for Respondent in No. 14–556, p. 8. Glucksberg did
insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed
manner, with central reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach
may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted
suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other
fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.
Id.
220. Id. at 2598.
221. See Baker v. Nelsen, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (holding there was no federal question raised
by marriage being an opposite-sex institution), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (in which the Court refused to hear a challenge to
Virginia’s miscegenation statute), overruled by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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here is derived from the basic interest in freedom as autonomy combined with
the existing institution of marriage.222 Moreover, what makes the right to marry
or any right fundamental is its impact on basic well-being compared to its
nonexistence or circumscribed application where the reasons are not in service
to maximize overall well-being. Although the right to marry is fundamental, it
is not basic in the sense of being a basic freedom because it is not independent
of institutional facts or social conventions.223 Consequently, when it becomes
apparent over time that some of the conventions that may have previously gone
unnoticed when describing the institution may now be regarded as
discriminatory, equality becomes important to rid the institution of its
discriminatory elements. This is where Equal Protection instructs the meaning
and reach of the liberty. Not allowing access by various groups to the essential
ingredients that make the institution self-fulfilling, such as the ability to make
more efficient health care and property decisions among spouses, or the selffulfillment from public identification as a fully committed unit, are reasons to
alter the institution’s description, absent a compelling reason for maintaining the
existing description.224 For it is these essential elements that describe the basic
liberty interest behind the institution and shows what makes the institution
attractive.
Foremost among the self-fulfilling interests that explain why marriage is
fundamental is the role it plays for the couple and society at large by publicly
affirming the couple’s decision to be seen and treated both legally and socially
as a unit.225 That factor should be seen as central to the Due Process liberty
aspect that gives rise to the fundamental right once it is recognized that other
factors, such as the ability to naturally procreate, are not necessary to the
determination of this fundamental right.226 History and tradition may play a role
here, but only in serving to bring into the foreground this important self-fulfilling
222. See SAMAR, supra note 126, at 68–69.
223. See id.
224. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. Justice Kennedy states the four “reasons marriage is
fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.” Id. First, “the
right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” Id.
Second, “the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other
in its importance to the committed individuals.” Id. The next reason “is that it safeguards children
and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childbearing, procreation, and
education.” Id. at 2600. Finally, “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that
marriage is a keystone of our social order. Id. at 2601.
225. See Samar, supra note 205, at 791–97.
226. See Jamal Green, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE L. J. 1988, 1989,
1994, 1996 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Turner v. Safely, 482
U.S. 78 (1987), holding unconstitutional a Missouri prison regulation that denied inmates “the right
to marry except for ‘compelling reasons’”—“generally only pregnancy or birth of a child[,]” with
“no procreation justification” and “the ‘conception’ variable . . . eliminated by the restrictions of
prison life”—“demonstrates . . . that marriage is fundamental under the U.S. Constitution not
because it provides a setting for heterosexual procreation but because it solemnizes a social
relationship that individuals regard as fundamentally important”).
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factor once other considerations are no longer found to be material. Since other
considerations may have at one time been thought to be material, this also means
that history and tradition are only guides to discovering why the institution might
have originally been thought to be fundamental, not the basis for its
fundamentalism. History and tradition do not provide normative grounds even
if they do provide a factual background for racial or sex-based discrimination,
let alone establish such discrimination as fundamental. What makes the right to
marry fundamental, then, is its special connection to the basic, natural
background liberty interest in freedom that most people identify as important to
their own self-fulfillment, and without which would otherwise be very difficult
to fully obtain.
A separate question concerns biases that might limit whose basic liberties the
law will protect in any given situation. Here, Equal Protection as a form of
comparative equality analysis, can be seen to borrow from a kind of Gewirthian
analysis to protect against classifications that are deemed invidious.227 Gewirth
noted that “the PGC requires a general respect for all other prospective purposive
agents with regard not only to the external effects of their agency but also, and
primarily, to the factors of rational personhood and aspiration that support and
generate these effects.”228 He points out that “[i]n consequence of such respect,
each person must refrain from feelings or exhibiting contempt toward others;
persons must not be insulted, belittled, or patronized, nor must they be
discriminated against on grounds of race, religion, or nationality.”229 Obviously,
“the factors of rational personhood and aspiration” are closely linked to the
basic, non-subtractive, and additive goods of well-being, all of which are
important to human self-fulfillment.230 As such, it is fair to say that a similar
link should exist between these goods and the safeguards of equality that Equal
Protection affords. Such safeguards include, beyond affording some rational
basis protection for additive goods, an application of strict scrutiny for any
denial of fundamental rights likely to impact basic liberties. These safeguards
should also apply when the government classifies a group based on race or
ethnicity, as such classifications are highly likely (given past history and
experience) to be discriminatory and thus denying of the full range of human
agency.231 And even in those cases where a short-term racial bias might be
justified to offset presently existing effects of past racial discrimination—
because the nature of the de facto discrimination is so endemic to existing social
structures as to provide no other alternative for resolution—Equal Protection, as
227. See Equal Protection Analysis Under Both the Equal Protection Component of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause,
WESTERN
NEW
ENGLAND
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
https://www.wneclaw.com/conlaw/epreview2013.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
228. GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 242.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 170–71.
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an operant of fair equality, requires that the ability to discriminate be narrowly
tailored so as not to sweep too broadly into what otherwise would be a protected
area of background liberty rights.232
Additionally, governmental classifications that are likely to be pursued simply
because of some underlying stereotype involving gender or illegitimacy should
be subject to heightened scrutiny to ensure they are indeed supported by “an
important governmental interest,” and only attained by “means that are
substantially related to that interest.”233 This set of categories should also
include forms of invidious discrimination based on sexual orientation, as these
too would be just as likely to be irrelevant as classifications involving race,
religion, nationality, or sex (including trans-sex). Here, one sees that such
classifications only appear to pit one’s ability to be an agent against another’s,
whose apparent purpose-fulfillment may be masking a hidden claim to
superiority.
For most other classifications, however, it is usually enough that the
government show a rational connection “to a legitimate governmental interest,”
regardless of how well the connection actually serves that interest.234 This latter
can be seen as a way well-being might also be advanced by recourse to the
freedoms associated with the normal democratic processes, provided they are
available and operative. However, as mentioned earlier, some classifications
brought under rational basis, involving mental health235 or denial of a legislative
remedy to prevent sexual orientation discrimination without first obtaining a
state constitutional amendment,236 were properly afforded a heightened form of
rational basis review because it appeared that the government action may have
been the result of prejudice or antipathy against a politically powerless group.237
232. See id.
233. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1961) (stating a Virginia statute based on race
should be subject to strict scrutiny, whereas gender and illegitimacy are subject to intermediate
scrutiny).
234. In other words, the liberties that rational basis traditionally concerns itself with are usually
not the kind likely to be thought fundamental or even quasi-suspect when denied and, therefore,
from a Gewirthian perspective, may not present themselves as challenging basic well-being. Where
they do so present themselves, usually only after a period of consciousness raising, as with the
marriage cases, the liberties deserve greater scrutiny to ensure basic well-being is not being denied.
235. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (vacating the
lower court’s judgment that mental illness was a quasi-suspect class, but still holding that zoning
ordinances were invalid as applied to respondent).
236. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (enjoining the amendment to the
Colorado Constitution prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state
or local government).
237. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449 (holding that the City’s denial of a special use
permit for a home for the mentally ill, where other apartment buildings, fraternity and sorority
houses, and hospitals were free to locate, was based on a prejudice against the “mentally retarded”);
see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held “that the
disadvantage [created by Colorado’s Amendment 2] imposed is born of animosity toward the class
of [lesbians, gays, and bisexual] persons affected”).

2019]

At the Intersection of Due Process and Equal Protection

127

In these instances, the government had to show more than just a rational
connection to a legitimate governmental interest, something more substantial to
acknowledge the likely potential for harm that might affect these individuals’
basic well-being.238 Exactly how much more the government has to show has
not yet been made clear by the Court, although under one test, it must be strong
enough to offset a per se violation of Equal Protection.239 Certainly, this is an
area where further work needs to be done to ensure the basic liberties of affected
groups are protected.
On its face, the current classification scheme makes sense, but only as a
starting point, given how biases that may have gone previously unrecognized
become discovered through increased social awareness, as indicated by the
aforesaid cases. As such, there necessarily needs to be greater fluidity in the
determination of levels of scrutiny that courts will consider, as aspects of social
life not previously thought to be biased are now brought into public perception.
Here, it is important to take such perceptions into account, while at the same
time critically evaluating them, to ensure that courts do not mistake what might
be simply the result of a political choice by a legislature (such as creating a
graduated income tax) as giving rise to a new discriminated class or to a change
in the level of scrutiny, unless the legislation represents an obviously irrational
or unjustified bias, that is systemic in society, and degrading of human
dignity.240 This latter limitation is necessary to prevent new forms of
discrimination from taking hold that are likely to undermine the above
framework of liberties and equality that need to be protected if human autonomy
and overall purpose-fulfillment is to advance.
At the strict scrutiny level, this concern is accounted for when the class is
identified as a “suspect class” because it has suffered historical discrimination
238. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (holding zoning ordinances were invalid because
they were quasi-suspect as applied to the mentally ill).
239. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (Justice Kennedy writes, “A law declaring that in general it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense”).
240. See Justice Steven’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HAR. L. REV. 1146, 1153–54
(1987). The author argues:
Justice Stevens has developed an alternative to the three-tiered approach of the Court.
Rather than focusing on abstract categorizations of classifications, Justice Stevens
conducts a case-by-case inquiry into the “relevance” of the classification to a valid public
purpose. In his equal protection lexicon, the requirement of relevance to a valid public
purpose means that the characteristic or trait or behavior singled out to identify a group
for legislative benefit or burden must “provide a justification for treating [the members
of the two classes] differently.” Of course, relevance alone can be understood to be a
tautological concept. Justice Stevens’ approach, however, is given direction through
incorporation of normative premises that reflect a social vision of equality, providing his
inquiry into relevance with substantive content. Although this content does not promise
mechanical consistency of result, it would enable other judges to apply Justice Stevens’
method with shared direction.
Id.
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for reasons irrelevant to its ability to perform and contrary to the ideals of Equal
Protection, and the class is generally thought to be politically powerless to
correct the discrimination by access to the political branches.241 Under such
circumstances, Equal Protection should operate to protect against unwarranted
bias against any group, since the nature of the bias itself will affect basic wellbeing of how people are viewed, as it will likely prevent opportunity for
correction by the normal political process. By and large, the concerns least
needed for such strict or even heightened scrutiny involve distributions of
benefits or detriments thought to impact only comparatively minor liberty
interests or interests that are likely to be handled by the normal political process,
and certainly only ones that have never been thought to be fundamental.242
What should be the criteria for determining whether the interest is
fundamental? In Plyler, the Court held that “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’
granted to individuals by the Constitution.”243 Perhaps this should now be
reconsidered, given how important access to educational opportunities are for
advancing individual well-being and full participation in a free society, as the
Court in Plyler itself admitted.244 Indeed, education itself, even aside from its
obvious usefulness in obtaining a job and living a full life, will provide the tools
for discovering forms of discrimination not traditionally recognized but, when
recognized, serve the overall good of society by protecting the basic well-being
of all society’s members.245 So, even when not considered a fundamental right,
access to education is certainly a liberty interest of upmost importance both to
the individual and society.246 Indeed, one could speculate, though probably
mistakenly, that the only reason for education not being a fundamental right is
because its importance to society is well recognized, although not necessarily in
the same way or for the same purposes that one would expect the political
branches to take it adequately into account.247 Of course, how little this is true
is easily seen if one examines the different views political parties have about
241. See Suspect Classes: Defining Suspect Classes, L. IN CONTEMP. SOC’Y (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/twiki/bin/view/LawContempSoc/MarcLegrandFirstPaper.
242. Know Your Constitution (4): What is Equal Protection?, NAHMOD LAW,
https://nahmodlaw.com/2013/01/31/know-your-constitution-4-what-is-equal-protection/
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2019). “When government discriminates or classifies in connection with economic
regulation and business, then the Court uses ‘rational basis review.’” Id.
243. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
244. Id. at 221. “The ‘American’ people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition
of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.” Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923)).
245. Id. at 221–22. In Plyler, the Court also stated: “We have recognized ‘the public schools
as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government.’” Id. at
221 (citing Abington Sch. District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)).
246. See id. at 221–22 (explaining that public education is not a right but emphasized its value
to individuals and society where a state legislature passed a statute authorizing local school districts
to deny enrollment in public schools to children who were not legally admitted to the country).
247. Peter Cunningham, Why Isn’t Education a Voting Issue?, EDUC. POST,
http://educationpost.org/why-isnt-education-a-voting-issue/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
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education and how few political contests are actually determined on the basis of
educational issues.248
However, the importance of education to the individual should also be
considered when particular groups are denied access to education because they
are politically powerless. This was the issue in Plyler.249 There, the concern
that undocumented Mexican children might be systematically denied an
education stood out as an equality-based reason for the Court to hold that such
denial placed the state in the position of likely creating a “subclass of
[unemployable] illiterates[,]” among persons who, because of their young age,
had done no wrong by being in the country.250 Nevertheless, these children
would suffer throughout their life by being denied access to the same public
education documented children would automatically be entitled to.251 Since
undocumented children had not been identified by the Court as a suspect class
directly warranting heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection, the Court,
nevertheless, could see the unfairness and effect on basic well-being that would
result when innocent children brought into the country are denied an education
necessary to become productive members of society wherever they might live.252
But if this is not just a policy choice, as courts are not supposed to make policy,
the principle behind it must be made clear.
It is true that policies, like those involving public school funding, insofar as
they concern the economic, social, and political goals of the society, have
generally been left to be decided by the political branches of the states and not
to be resolved by the federal courts.253 Indeed, this is seen to be consonant with
a person’s ability to express her autonomy through the democratic process.
However, these policies must be subject to judicial review, usually by state
courts under state constitutional restrictions in order to protect against policy
choices that might be fundamentally unfair.254 This is not an invasion of a
248. See The Quick Guide to America’s Political Parties Stances on Education Issues,
https://www.isidewith.com/political-parties/issues/education (last visited Oct. 26,
2018); see also The Big Issues of the 2016 Campaign and Where the Presidential Candidates Stand
on Them, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 19, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/year-aheadproject/#part1 (showing that although the different political parties and candidates have different
educational stances, only 4% of the public rate education as America’s most important problem).
249. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 207, 230.
252. See id. at 223 (explaining that education is not a fundamental right and that undocumented
immigrants cannot be treated as a suspect class where a state statute authorized local officials to
deny public school enrollment to undocumented students).
253. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (White, B., dissenting).
(holding “[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected”). This
decision allowed the Court to leave the matter of how schools get funded to state authorities.
254. See The State Role in Education Finance, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/state-role-in-education-finance.aspx (last visited Oct. 26,
2018).
ISIDEWITH,
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legislative prerogative by the judicial branch. If anything, it is quite the opposite.
It is protection of the fairness rights of individuals against legislative inattention.
The legislature, to secure some economic or political benefit of its own, ignores
principles of justice and fairness essential to basic well-being just because it can
do so with little or no consequence to itself.
What the Court did in Plyer was the opposite of what it did in Obergefell and
Loving, where it extracted from the definition of marriage limitations that made
it less than generally accessible as a desirable institution.255 In Plyer, the Court
imputed into education, which it said was not a fundamental right, a degree of
importance as a matter of basic liberty because it was that importance that was
being systematically denied to a whole group of people who had no real say in
their being present in the United States.256 The Court was affirming the value of
education as a basic liberty interest because of its likely effect on a future class
of persons whose voice to the political branches would likely go unheard.
Where the liberty interest is fundamental, Equal Protection should operate to
ensure that any state interference is justified by a compelling interest that is
narrowly tailored, but that would include that the liberty interest not undermine
other equally fundamental rights. Such a compelling interest may sometimes
come about in the form of protecting another fundamental right that might
otherwise be seriously curtailed if the original fundamental interest in question
is treated as absolute. Since the two interests would both be deemed
fundamental, the question has to be asked which interest provides the greater
respect, or least harm, to overall purpose-fulfillment as an essential ingredient to
human well-being.257 For example, allowing a baker of wedding cakes to refuse
to make a cake for a same-sex wedding—because it would violate the baker’s
sincerely held religious convictions—is an example of where choosing to enter
the wedding cake business (itself a less than fundamental liberty interest)258 must
be accompanied by a commitment to serve the public as a whole. If not so
viewed, the denial could negatively implicate the fundamental right to marry as
a socially established institution that has a wide-ranging effect on human selffulfillment, and for which the government (if it allowed businesses to
discriminate) would be complicit in disavowing. Here is where the liberty
interest to become a wedding cake-maker, florist, or operator of a reception hall,
255. Compare Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (finding that although education is not a fundamental
right, the state interest argued for by Texas was insufficient to justify the denial of rights), with
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (holding same-sex couples have the same
fundamental right to marry as heterosexual couples), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(declaring unconstitutional Virginia’s miscegenation statute).
256. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
257. ALAN GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 54. Recall the earlier discussion of Gewirth’s three
distinct kinds of goods that make up human well-being and the order a rational actor would place
them. Id.
258. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that a New York
labor law limiting the working time for bakers violated the liberty to contract protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
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must not be allowed to limit the freedom of others to exercise their fundamental
rights in a society, especially when such exercise is protected by a public
accommodations laws.259 This is made especially poignant (but only in fact, not
in principle) if the couple resides in an area where only a single cake maker,
florist, or operator of a reception hall exists. So, the point is general.
The collective well-being that same-sex couples experience when they make
use of the cultural symbols that express their marriage is likely to be a part of
the essential self-fulfillment that accompanies the marriage, and without which
they might feel that their marriage is not as good as others. Thus, when
businesses that are supposed to be serving the public without discrimination are
allowed to deny access to these important symbols of marriage because of
personal religious beliefs, the result is likely to have a greater negative impact
on the self-fulfillment of the discriminated group because it bears societal
approval.260 The same degree of lack of self-fulfillment does not need to be
experienced in the reverse. The individual baker in satisfying his or her own
religious tenets could still be consonant with his sincerely held religious beliefs
either by not being in the wedding cake business at all, or by pursuing other
avenues (such as the presentation of his own values in appropriate public
forums) that do not deny a particular culturally relevant good or service to a
specific class of persons. Indeed, the situation of the baker who refuses to
provide a cake for a same-sex wedding is no different from that of another baker
who, on religious grounds, might refuse to make a wedding cake for an
interracial couple whose interracial marriage his religion did not recognize.261
The same would not be true, however, if a clergyperson chose not to marry a
same-sex couple and was told by the government that she must do so. In that
case, the fundamental right of free exercise of religion overrides any claim of
access because the government is not complicit in the religious operation and in
fact, under the First Amendment, is barred from being so involved, and also
because choice of religion is generally regarded as a personal right that
traditionally has been thought to not affect others.262 Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
can be seen to reflect this private view of religion insofar as his criticism was
directed at the Civil Rights Commissioners who made disparaging remarks
259. See Vincent J. Samar, Toward a New Separation of Church and State: Implications for
Analogies to the Supreme Court Decision in Hobby Lobby by the Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,
36 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 27 (2016) (arguing that “Obergefell v. Hodges provides a powerful
justification for a state court to find that its laws do bar private sector discrimination of same-sex
marriages”).
260. See generally James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the
Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 99, 104 (2015).
261. Id. at 101–02.
262. See
generally
Free
Exercise
of
Religion,
JUSTIA,
https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-01/03-free-exercise-of-religion.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2019).
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about the cakemaker’s religious beliefs.263 And insofar as anyone’s beliefs are
private, those beliefs do not, on their own, invite intrusion by the state because
they are truly a self-regarding mental act in which no one else’s interest is
involved, regardless of whether others would agree or disagree with them.264
That said, focusing on the baker’s sincerely held religious beliefs as the reason
for him not making a wedding cake and not his lack of action, as was arguably
done by the Commission, confuses the issue because it invites the question
whether a cakemaker may be required to compromise his beliefs in order to
conform to laws that require public accommodations not to discriminate against
same-sex couples.265 Moreover, it opens the door to a different question:
whether, under the First Amendment, the state can legitimately criticize the
baker’s religious belief which, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, it clearly cannot.
Even if there exists a causal connection between the belief and the inaction, the
two issues are not necessarily connected. Presumably, the belief could have still
been held by the cakemaker, even expressed in other forums without failing to
provide the business accommodation. Were, however, the cakemaker asked to
263. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018).
Justice Kennedy notes two interpretations of what the commissioners meant when they “endorsed
the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial
domain” at a public hearing on May 30, 2014. Id. Under the first interpretation “they might mean
simply that a business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation.” Id. Under
the second interpretation, “they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments showing
lack of due consideration for Phillips’s free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced.” Id.
However, at a subsequent meeting on July 25, 2014, one commissioner said religion has been used
to justify slavery and the holocaust and called it, “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric,”
leading Justice Kennedy to adopt the latter interpretation. Id.
264. John Stuart Mill describes one kind of self-regarding act “the inward domain of
consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of
thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 1 (P.F. Collier
& Son 1909). See also SAMAR, supra note 126, at 68. Samar wrote that “[a]n action is selfregarding (private) with respect to a group of other actors if and only if the consequences of the
act impinge in the first instance on the basic interests of the actor and not on the interests of the
specified class of actors.” Id. By “in the first instance” it is meant that the description of the action
would not include “any additional facts or causal theories[,]” such that a prima facie claim to
privacy would be possible. Id. at 67. Here the basic interests are freedom and well-being in which
the first category “includes interests in freedom of expression, privacy, freedom of thought,
worship, and so on.” Id. at 68. Samar goes on to note that “well-being includes interests in
preserving one’s life, health, physical integrity (as in not being assaulted), and mental equilibrium.”
Id. The other important concern is that “[i]n neither of these two categories are particular
conceptions about facts or social conventions presupposed.” Id. Clearly under this view shared by
Mill and Samar, religious beliefs in themselves are private.
265. It may very well be that the sincerely held beliefs caused the baker to refuse to make the
wedding cake. The philosopher, Donald Davidson argues “that rationalization is a species of causal
explanation.” DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (1980). But the issue is
not what caused the refusal, which might be (and in this case is) private, but whether the refusal
itself, which is clearly public, is justified. That is a different matter because public acts may often
come about because of private beliefs that are themselves unassailable.
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write a statement (such as one regarding the kind of marriages Christianity
supports), portray a symbol (such as swastika), or depict an action (such as
fellatio), that he would not write or portray on any customer’s cake, the situation
would be quite different because it asks him to go beyond what he would do for
any customer in the same situation, thus bringing the action outside Equal
Protection guarantees and indeed implicating what beliefs he feels comfortable
expressing in violation of First Amendment speech and free exercise
protections.266
The belief itself is private insofar as it is the mental acceptance of an idea as
true, and thus its protection is a basic liberty interest. It is the failure to provide
the accommodation to all on the same basis that is not private and thus also
undermines a basic well-being interest in the equal right of others to access the
institution of marriage in all its cultural aspects. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, had
the Commission focused on the failure to provide the accommodation and not
the cause of the failure (the private belief), its decision would and should have
been upheld.267 Then, the question would properly be whether the failure to
provide the accommodation was truly an other-regarding act that society’s
fundamental concern to preserve equality provides a justification to prevent.
The failure of the Commission to focus its criticism on the baker’s unwillingness
to provide its business service to the general public, instead of focusing on the
Commissions members’ disagreement with the religious belief of the individual
cake maker, grounded Justice Kennedy’s narrow opinion in favor of the
Cakeshop.
This analysis also provides support for where to draw the line on appeals to
religious beliefs when individuals and organizations enter into the provision of
public services in the 20th/21st centuries—such as hospitals, adoption agencies,
social service agencies, employers, insurance payors, and more.268 Operators of
these institutions are not similarly situated with clergy, because while religion is
highly personal in its self-fulfillment, control over commerce, including public
accommodations and health provisioning, is normally an area of government
responsibility.269 The government might allow some religious-based limitations
266. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1735–36. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
describes approvingly “at least three other occasions the Civil Rights Division considered the
refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage,
along with religious text.” Id. at 1730.
267. Id. at 1734. At the end of his opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy writes:
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in
the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting
gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.
Id. at 1732.
268. Andrew Copson, Services Must Stay Secular, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/dec/05/guardiansocietysupplement.comment.
269. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
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in these areas for delivery of goods and services by not-for-profit organizations,
insofar as these may have little impact on the public, since they are thought to
be more closely associated with particular groups who already share the
provider’s beliefs.270 However, especially in the for-profit commercial area, the
issue becomes more problematic if the religious organization operates a business
that serves the public; for then, in respect to that operation, the business should
not be immune from charges of discrimination in employment, housing, or
public accommodations.271
This suggests that persons or organizations who would find themselves at
odds with their own sincerely held beliefs by complying with public
accommodations laws when providing a good or service, generally should not
be operating as a for-profit business, and instead limit those products or services
to which they associate special symbolism to private or not-for-profit activities
that the law does not in the same respect restrict. The baker in the wedding cake
example, where a public accommodation law prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation, could by operating as a non-profit, limit his making of
wedding cakes only for opposite-sex couples because now he would no longer
be operating as a business serving the public as a whole. Of those products, he
might wish to not make available to the public as a whole, he could continue to
provide as a non-profit operation connected to a particular religious view, so
long as he did not, at the same time, hold himself out to the public as a business
proving wedding cakes unavailable to everyone. Equality in service to
supporting collective self-fulfillment must therefore be part of any decision
regarding such a conflict of rights. It may not just be set aside whenever an
individual’s liberty interest might give rise to a conflict, or the equality concern
will be lost in its entirety and the natural right to equal liberty itself will be
endangered of evisceration.
If the right to enter a business is a protected liberty interest, it certainly should
not be construed to undermine fundamental liberty rights of anybody, for that
would undercut the overarching protection of the person, understood
collectively, on which this analysis has been based.272 Indeed, if the ultimate
goal is to protect basic liberty in its fullest sense, as the cases mentioned suggest,
270. In On Liberty, Mill also noted “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty,
within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not
involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced
or deceived.” MILL, supra note 264; see generally Susannah Camic Tahk, Tax-Exempt Hospitals
and Their Communities, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. 33, 35–37 (2014) (discussing the need for lawmakers
to grapple with how these hospitals define their communities).
271. See generally Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 192 (2012) (holding unanimously that a “teacher” was a minister and, as such, was not entitled
to file an Americans with Disabilities lawsuit against the school where she was employed).
272. In West Coast Hotel Co, the Court, while not explicitly overruling Lochner, upheld the
State of Washington’s minimum wage law, in effect signaling an end of the Lochner era in which
the Supreme Court invalidated laws designed to regulate business. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
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then instances where a rights conflict initiated by a lesser protected liberty
interest might interfere with a basic liberty or fundamental right, strict scrutiny
must be applied to ensure that the interference is truly in service to securing
maximal liberty for all. This should be the goal regardless of whether the
business owner(s) also can claim a protected classification based on religion, for
that claim can be alternatively handled without violating a fundamental right.
Personhood, in this collective sense, requires no less of the Court nor of
democracy. Indeed, when personhood is understood in the way just described, it
can serve as the ground for how the democracy is to operate in regard to
protecting fundamental rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that at the intersection of Due Process and Equal
Protection, a place Justice Kennedy identifies in Obergefell, there is need for
further clarification if lower courts are to be provided direction in deciding future
cases involving either doctrine, and especially in cases where the two doctrines
intersect. As it stands right now, exactly how such cases will be decided is
unclear, although the language in Obergefell and Plyler (the latter because of the
Court’s willingness to raise the level of scrutiny), when read together, suggest a
direction of where the law might be going. That direction is consistent with
subsuming fundamental rights doctrine and Equal Protection analysis under a
broader ethical theory of the person, understood collectively, that utilizes
personhood’s centrality of freedom and well-being to further clarify how the two
doctrines might operate together. Within that frame of reference, the
relationship between the two areas becomes clear as criteria begin to emerge for
deciding future cases where the doctrines intersect. Indeed, if this Article is
successful, it will be because it takes the reader to the next higher level of ethical
consideration, beyond mere legal doctrine, to finding a framework for providing
maximal autonomy and human self-fulfillment for all people.273

273. See generally VINCENT J. SAMAR, JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: PRACTICING LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 31–35, 76–78 (1998) (discussing the need for a philosophical foundation for law).
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